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During the period between 1789 and 1916 the United States trans-
formed itself from a predominantly agrarian country into an industrial
giant. Farming, shipping, and trading were the primary economic activi-
ties of 18th-century America;' manufacturing was not yet a salient
feature.' The American economy was characterized by small markets
and relatively inexpensive labor.' Improvements in economic organiza-
tion took the form of increased efficiency in shipping, communication,
and transportation, rather than in the development of new industries.4
It therefore is not surprising that economic growth, which is dependent
upon the development of new industries, advanced slowly during the
*B.A., J.D., Vanderbilt University; LL.M., Harvard University. Assistant Professor,
University of Georgia School of Law.
The author would like to acknowledge the significant contribution of Professor
Morton Horwitz of Harvard Law Scnool. Without his guidance and support, this
Article would not have been possible.
1. For a general outline of the development of the American economy from colonial
days to the present, see D. NORTH, GROWTH AND WELFARE IN m AMERICAN PAST
(1966). See gencrally T. COCHRAN & "W. MILLER, THE AGE OF ENTERRIusE (1942);
J. DORF,,MA, THE EcoVoNIIC MiND Ix AM.iE:RzCa CIVILwT&noN (1939); L. HACKER, THE
TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1940); E. KIRKLAND, INDUSTRY COM, ES OF AGE;
BusINEss, LABOR AND PLBLIC POLICY 1860-1897 (1961); C. NErrELS, THE EMERGENCE OF
A NATIONAL ECONOMY (1962); Reznick, The Rise and Early Developnient of Industrial
Consciousness in the United States, 4 J. EcoN. & Bus. HIsT. 784 (1931).
2. D. NORTH, supra note 1, at 17.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 17-18.
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18th century.5 By contrast, the 19th century was a period of unprece-
dented economic growth in the United States.6 The driving forces
behind this growth were the adoption of more efficient manufacturing
and agricultural techniques, an increase in education which made possible
the utilization of improved technology, and the availability of a vast
national market, making feasible large-scale production. 7 In 1860, the
percentage of national production attributable to manufacturing exceeded
that attributable to agriculture for the first time;8 by 1889, the United
States had become the most economically powerful nation in the world.'
This burgeoning of manufacturing in the United States produced an
industrial, urban society with concomitant social, political, and economic
problems.10 An increasing native population," immigration, 2 and ur-
banization, 3 though helping to produce large concentrated markets
and pools of resources that aided industrialization, served to crystalize
the basic conflict of interest between the developmental entrepreneurs
and those who suffered injury from the activities generated by economic
growth. A facet of this conflict is reflected in this period's substantive
and procedural' 4 law of private nuisance.
The traditional rule of the English common law of nuisances, adopted
by the colonies and the newly created states, imposed absolute liability
for interference with the enjoyment of property. 5 Unlike the modern
tort concept under which liability is not imposed absent some wrongful
or negligent conduct,' the common law rule, as expressed by the maxim
5. North indicates that the three features of "what makes a society more efficient"
are: technology, investment in human capital, and efficient economic organization. Id.
at 6. The colonial economy grew at an annual rate of not more than 1.6 percent. Id. at
17.
6. Id. at 31.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 19.
9. Id. at 28.
10. North, Industrialization in the United States in 6 CAMBRIDGE EcoNoMIc HISTORY
Or EUROPE 677 (2d ed. H. Habakkuk & M. Paston eds. 1965).
11. G. FITE & J. REESE, AN EcoNoMic HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 138 (1965).
12. D. NORTH, supra note 1, at 26.
13. Id.
14. The term "procedural" refers to the law of remedies in this area. See text accom-
panying note 50 infra.
15. Eighteenth century English law viewed property as an absolute title to a physical
entity. Blackstone described property as "that sole and despotic dominion which one
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of
the right of any other individual in the universe." 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
16. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 574 (4th ed. 1971).
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sic utere tuo ut alienm nzon laedas,17 flatly commanded that an individual
not use his property to injure others. The property owner was held to a
strict standard of absolute liability for his actions: any interference with
the enjoyment of neighboring property was actionable; 18 proof by a
defendant property owner that he was using his property in the safest
possible way was not a defense.19
Consistent application of the 18th-century standard of nuisance law
in the 19th century would have burdened the entrepreneur with a heavy
potential liability. Litigation expenses and damage judgments, though
increasing the cost of doing business, might be mitigated by price in-
creases. Alternatively, a lower rate of return could be imposed on all
entrepreneurs, but, as long as the relative returns to industry remained
higher than to other forms of investment, a ready supply of venture
capital would be forthcoming. The prohibitory injunction, however,
would have effectively stopped all entrepreneurial activity. If such
injunctions were readily accessible to private persons, industrialization
would have confronted a serious, if not insurmountable, obstacle.
This Article will explain how the 19th-century entrepreneur, faced
with a hostile rule of strict liability for interference with the use and
enjoyment of property, avoided the heavy hand of the chancellor's in-
junction. Although the term "entrepreneur" describes a diverse group of
businessmen-from the mill owner of the early 19th century to the
slaughterhouse operator of later in the century-the denominator com-
mon to all nuisance action in this period was a developmental use of real
property that interfered with the use of neighboring property. An ex-
amination of the responses of courts to private nuisance suits between
an individual property owner and the entrepreneur at various stages of
economic development will provide the framework for this study of the
evolution of nuisance doctrine. 0
17. Use your own so as not to injure others.
18. W. PRosSm, supra note 16, at 593.
19. Id. at 596.
20. A cynic might assume that industrialization was inevitable and that the opinions
of the chancellor in the determination of injunction actions were exercises in sophistry
to pave the way toward that inevitability, but this Article will attempt to examine
the doctrinal development from a neutral standpoint. Thus, capitalist motives are not
necessarily attributed to the chancellor. This can be left to the social "historian.
The primary concern of this Article will be the private suit for nuisance injunction,
but for comparison and amplification, reference will be made to the public nuisance
suit and the private suit for damages. Although the history of suits concerning impair-
ment of franchises, involving one businessman suing another on a theory of impairment
of the first's franchise, and suits concerning riparian rights would reflect the same
1976]
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THE PERIOD 1789 TO 1836
Economic development in the late 18th and early 19th centuries can
be divided into two stages. The first, from 1789 to 1810, was in many
respects a continuation of the colonial period.21 Manufacturing was con-
ducted in small shops by skilled craftsmen; commercial industries (such
as iron mills, breweries, and brick yards) showed little change in the
period following the revolution. The second period, from 1810 to 1836,
was one of gradual development and expansion.12 The economy grew
not by the development of new industries but by the expansion of estab-
lished ones.
Not surprisingly, the American entrepreneur rarely was subject to a
suit alleging a private nuisance during this period. Old relationships be-
tween the entrepreneur and his environment continued, though industrial
activity increased. Only nine private nuisance suits for injunction ap-
peared in case reports; the courts granted injunctions only twice.23 The
paucity of such suits and the handling given those that were brought are
evidence that a suit to enjoin a nuisance was an infrequently recognized
part of the American legal consciousness during this period. That
trend toward a prodevclopmental attitude on the part of the courts, these cases, con-
trolled by independently developed doctrine, will not be considered in this Article.
The 18th century law of riparian rights was antidevelopmental in awarding absolute
dominion to the first appropriator of water. In the 19th century, the law of riparian
rights evolved like nuisance law. See Lauer, Reflections on Riparianisrn, 35 Mo. L.
REv. 1 (1970).
Competitive injury, primarily between owners of newly created and previously estab-
lished mills was viewed as actionable in damages in 18th-century Massachusetts.
Taft v. Sargeants (Mass. 1784), as cited in Al. Horwitz, American Legal History 470
(1973) (unpublished teaching materials). Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v.
Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 419 (1837), aff'g 24 Mass. (7 Pick.)
344 (1830), marked the end of such actionability. Professor Villard Hurst has described
Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Charles River Bridge as "the classic statement of
policy in favor of freedom for creative change as against unyielding protection for
existing commitments .... V" W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN TIE
NINETEENTH-CENT'RY UNITED STATES 27 (1956).
21. G. FITE & J. REESE, supra note 11, at 208.
22. Id.
23. Ramsay v. Riddle, 20 F. Cas. 212 (No. 11,544) (C.C.D.C. 1806); Quakenbush v. Van
Riper, 3 N.J. Eq. 350 (1835); Southard v. Morris Canal & Banking Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 519
(1832); Corning v. Lowerre, 6 Johns. Ch. 439 (N.Y. 1822); Gardner v. Trustees of
the Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816); Eason v. Perkins, 17 N.C. 40
(1831); Caldwell v. Knott, 18 Tenn. 209 (1836); Beveridge v. Lacey, 24 Va. (3 Rand.)
63 (1824); Wingfield v. Crenshaw, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 474 (1809). Only in Corning
and Gardner were the injunctions granted.
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equity had jurisdiction to enjoin a private nuisance generally was not
conceded.24
Courts faced with injunction suits in this early period used a proce-
dural analysis that concentrated on the availability of the injunctive
remedy. By this method, the early courts avoided application of the pre-
vailing orthodox definition of a nuisance: "[I]f it [the defendant's act]
causes either [hurt, annoyance or damage] in the least degree, the person
creating it must be answerable for the consequences." 25 This analysis,
focusing on the injunctive remedy, mitigated the potentially harsh effects
on defendant entrepreneurs.
An analysis of the early decisions reveals how foreign the injunction
suit appeared to the judges. For example in Rarnsay v. Riddle,26 the
plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from converting his warehouse
into a bakehouse; the plaintiff claimed that the increased traffic and
noxious odors, as well as the heightened danger of fire in the neighborhood
because of the bakehouse, would render the defendant's business a nui-
sance. The federal circuit court refused to grant the injunction before the
conversion of the defendant's building but conceded that ". . . if the
house, in fitting up, should not be well secured against danger from fire,
24. Nathan Dane, in the first general abridgement of American law, discussed the
remedies for a private nuisance without even alluding to the possibility of injunctive
relief in such a case. 3 N. DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGESr OF AMERIcAN
LAW 50-52 (1824). Chancellor Kent himself, though he did grant two injunctions in
private nuisance cases, see Corning v. Lowerre, 6 Johns. Ch. 439 (N.Y. 1822); Gardner v.
Trustees of the Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816), warned that the
injunction was not a normal remedy in nuisance cases and should be granted only
"with the utmost caution." Attorney Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371, 379
(N.Y. 1817). In the latter case, Kent implied that there was no jurisdiction at all in
courts of equity to enjoin public nuisances. During this period, the English courts
clearly recognized the availability of injunctive relief in cases of private nuisance.
R. EDEN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJcLcTIo. s 222 (Am. ed. 1822). Significantly,
however, Eden reported that he "had not been able to find a precedent in which the
court has actually interfered to restrain the carrying on of a noxious trade . . . " Id.
at 226. In an English case seeking injunctive relief against a manufacturer who was
creating a nuisance during this era, counsel for defendant wrote that "if every manu-
factory disagreeable to the neighborhood . . . is to be treated as a nuisance, however
material to the prosperity of the country, the effect will be most important." Attorney
Gen. v. Cleaver, 34 Eng. Rep. 297, 298, 18 Ves. 211, 214 (Ch. 1811). English chancery
interference in nuisance cases was rare until around 1811. Watrous, Torts, in Two
CENTURIES' GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW, 1701-1901 (1901). However, in the 18th
century the suit by a private party for an injunction against a nuisance was not a
rarity. See, e.g., Baines v. Baker, 27 Eng. Rep. 105, Amb. 158 (Ch. 1752); Coulson v.
White, 26 Eng. Rep. 816, 3 Atk. 21 (Ch. 1743).
25. Cooper v. Hall, 5 Ohio 321, 323 (1832).
26. 20 F. Cas. 212 (No. 11,544) (C.C.D.C. 1806).
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it might be the ground of an injunction to prevent the use of it as a bake-
house." 27 This same type of refusal to enjoin prospective nuisances
became common later in the century.
Similarly, in Beveridge v. Lacey, 28 an 1824 decision of the Supreme
Court of Virginia, an injunction was denied a private party for a nuisance
that could be considered a public one. The defendant shopkeeper was
alleged to have caused considerable nuisance to the plaintiff by digging
in the public street in front of the plaintiff's house in an attempt to create
a smoother slope in the street. Although later in the century, courts
conceded that a private party could enjoin a public nuisance if special
damages were shown to have been incurred 2 9 this court, stating that
"it is not the province of a Court of Equity, to correct abuses merely
public," 30 seemed to imply that there was no equity jurisdiction at all
over public nuisances. Moreover, in Southard v. Morris Canal & Banking
Co.,31 a plaintiff sought to enjoin as a nuisance the operation of a dam
by the defendant canal company. The New Jersey chancery court,
basing its decision in part on a showing that the dam had been operated
for several years without any objection, declined to grant relief. This
reasoning, similar to the doctrine of laches, was quite prevalent later in
the century.3 2
The North Carolina courts used procedural analysis to the fullest
extent. In Eason v. Perkins,3 a neighboring, private plaintiff sought to
enjoin a defendant from rebuilding a mill that previously had been al-
lowed to deteriorate. He asserted that the flooding and health hazards
that would be created by the mill would make it a public nuisance to the
community and a private nuisance to him. The court, failing to consider
whether there was a nuisance, viewed the problem to be purely proce-
dural. A rudimentary balancing test was invoked by the court, which
concluded that "[t]here is nothing in this case but the interest of a single
individual to weigh against public utility." 34 To buttress this con-
clusion, the court pointed to the state's mill act, which limited the plain-
tiff's recovery in damages. It would be anomalous, the court reasoned,
to enjoin the mill when even the damage recovery had been limited by
27. Id.
28. 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 63 (1824).
29. See notes 97-109 infra & accompanying text.
30. 24 Va. at 65.
31. 1 N.J. Eq. 519 (1832).
32. See notes 72-75 infra & accompanying text.
33. 17 N.C. 38 (1831).
34. Id. at 41.
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the legislature, the predominant policymaker for the state. This balancing
test became the primary device for protecting entrepreneurs later in the
century.
Equity courts may have declined to enjoin private nuisances because
the suit involved title to real property and therefore should be determined
by a law court with a jury, rather than by a nonjury chancery court.
The New Jersey chancellor ruled, in Quackeninish v. Van Riper,3 5 that
there could be no injunction against a nuisance if there had been no vio-
lation of a "clear or serious right." Presumably, this clear right would
have to be shown in a law proceeding. In Quackenbush, the plaintiff was
a private landowner who was seeking to enjoin as a nuisance the opera-
tion of defendant's mill. The evidence showed that there had been flood-
ing of the plaintiff's land. Although a later New Jersey decision3 1 seemed
to view this case as applying a balancing test, the chancellor apparently
was deferring to the law court because of the presence of real property
in the dispute. In Caldwell v. Knott,37 a Tennessee farmer sought to en-
join the defendant's operation of his milldam. This equity court was even
more explicit in deferring to the law court. "The determination. . . of
opposing rights, is purely a legal question and until such a determination
a court of chancery will not interfere." 38 Professor William Draper
Lewis, reviewing early American chancery decisions, wrote that "down
to the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the idea that all
cases involving the legal title to real property should be tried by jury in
a common law action was firmly embedded in the professional mind." 3 9
This was apparently true in the nuisance cases as well, and the deference
to law lasted even later than 1825.
The only two injunctions granted on private nuisance grounds before
1837 were issued by Chancellor James Kent of New York. The first,
Gardner v. Trustees of the Village of Newburgh,40 was a riparian rights
case and not properly considered with the purely private nuisance cases;
in the second, Corning v. Lo'wene,4' Kent granted an injunction against
the obstruction of a public street. The defendant asserted that this was
35. 3 N.J. Eq. 350 (1835).
36. See Hennessy v. Carmony, 50 N.J. Eq. 616, 621, 25 A. 374, 378 (1892).
37. 18 Tenn. 209 (1836).
38. Id. at 211.
39. Lewis, Injunctions Against Nuisances and the Rule Requiring the Plaintiff to Estab-
lish His Right at Law, 56 U. PA. L. REv. 289, 295 (1908).
40. 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816).
41. 6 Johns. Ch. 439 (N.Y. 1822).
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merely a public nuisance, but Kent found that there was a special injury
to the plaintiffs "affecting the enjoyment of their property."
THE PERIOD 1837 TO 1870
The years 1837 to 1870 witnessed a remarkable change in the
American economy. In 1839, agriculture provided almost 70 percent of
the value of commodity output of the national economy; manufacturing,
mining, and construction together accounted for the remaining 30
percent.42 By 1870, the share of agriculture was reduced to 50 percent,
with the remaining 50 percent being shared by manufacturing, mining,
and construction. Obviously, this was a period of rapid industrial growth.
Investment in manufacturing increased substantially,43 and with it a
trend toward large-scale industry and the expansion of the factory
system.14
With this transformation in the economy came increasing friction
between the prodevelopmental entrepreneur and his neighbors. During
the mid-19th century, courts groped to fit a rule of law to the demands
of a new environment. Although few injunctions against entrepreneurs
were granted, the case reports and legal literature reflected a shift in atti-
tudes: the injunction suit no longer appeared foreign to the courts, which
now focused on the availability of injunctive relief rather than on the
existence or nonexistence of a nuisance.
The most striking aspect of this period was the substantial increase
in the number of actions for injunctions brought by aggrieved home-
owners and property owners against alleged private nuisances; in the
early part of the century very few such property owners sought injunc-
tive relief.4" As an illustration of this change, Nathan Dane's first abridge-
ment of American law, published in 1824, did not even suggest the possi-
bility of injunction as a remedy in private nuisance.46 On the other hand,
Story's Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, published on the eve
of this middle period, in describing the general use of the injunctive
remedy stated that "courts of equity now interfere, and effectuate their
decrees in many cases by injunctions." 47 He also obliquely acknowl-
edged that nuisance was a fit subject for injunctive relief, warning "it is
42. D. NORTH, supra note 1, at 19-20.
43. G. FIT & J. REESE, supra note 11, at 209.
44. Id.
45. See note 23 supra & accompanying text.
46. See note 24 supra.
47. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 959 (1836).
[Vol. 17:621
NUISANCE INJUNCTIONS
not every case, which would furnish a right of action against a party for
a nuisance, which would justify the interposition of courts of equity
to redress the injury, or remove the annoyance." 48 Despite the fact that
relatively few injunctions were granted, most courts during this period
made at least some effort to rationalize and explain their denial of plain-
tiffs' claims; no longer was the injunction out of the realm of possibility-
Nevertheless, the nuisance injunction gained slow acceptance into the
American legal consciousness.49 Until the end of the century, much of
the collective energy of the courts was devoted to the definition of the
zone of cases in which the grant would be proper.
In addition to the changing judicial attitude toward the availability
of the injunctive remedy in private nuisance cases, other factors contri-
buted to the greatly increased amount of litigation. Not only did in-
creased industrialization provide more potential defendants, but this in-
dustrialization was of a different quality than that of the earlier period.
Increasingly, defendants in this period were railroad builders and factory
operators. Although the defendant mill owners of the earlier period
clearly had interfered with the private use and enjoyment of property,
railroads and factories were making more significant intrusions with
more serious consequences. The noise, smoke, and fumes of the factory
and the railroad were major, tangible interferences, verging on physical
trespasses. Additionally, a broader range of possible plaintiffs was created
as railroads stretched on for miles through city and farmland. Unlike a
milldam that might overflow and ruin the crops of one or two neigh-
bors, an interference caused by a factory or railroad threatened many
"neighbors." The increase in population and the clustering of this popu-
lation in urban areas heightened both the demands on American industry
and the likelihood of conflict between the interests of the homeowner
and of the entrepreneur.
Procedure from 1837 to 1870
Because the substantive law of nuisance remained plaintiff-oriented,"0
"procedural" or remedial defenses provided refuge for the defendant en-
48. Id. at 5 925.
49. By 1865, a treatise writer could state "a very frequent ground of injunction is
nuisance." F. HILLIARD, THE LAW OF INjtNjcnoNs 269 (1865). See also 2 R. EDEN, A
COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS AND OF INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS
IN THE NATURE OF INJU-cTIOxs 267-70 (Waterman ed. 1852); J. HOLCOMBE, AN ImtRo-
DUCTION TO EQUITY JLRISPRUDENCE 159 (1846).
50. See notes 110-122 infra & accompanying text.
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trepreneur in nuisance injunction suits during this period. In this context
"procedural" refers to all doctrines that either denied or delayed injunc-
tive relief without addressing the issue of the existence of a nuisance;
courts relying on such procedural grounds then could avoid the plaintiff-
oriented substantive law of nuisance.
The courts during this period articulated various formulations of pro-
cedural considerations. Some were drawn broadly from historical
maxims of equitable jurisdiction, while others were developed with par-
ticular reference to nuisance litigation. Traditional expressions of the
chancellor's limited jurisdiction-that equity does not interfere if the
complainant's rights clearly are not established, nor aid those who sleep
on their rights, nor interfere if there is a complete and adequate remedy
at law-often were stated. In addition, the entrepreneur defendant uti-
lized two defenses specific to the nuisance field, the public nuisance de-
fense and the harmless building defense. Although these two defenses had
their roots in prior case law, both reached their peak between 1837 and
1870.
The most striking procedural development during this period was
the sudden realization and acknowledgement on the part of the chancel-
lors that their jurisdiction was something more than a mechanical appli-
cation of wooden principles. Chancellors openly conceded that their
actions depended on a great variety of factors and that the granting of
equitable relief was not a matter of right, but of grace. The decisions in
the early 19th century never addressed the issue of "entitlement" to
equitable relief. Chancellors, though not acting on common law prin-
ciples, certainly mentioned nothing about the totality of circumstances
or the discretion of the court as affecting the exercise of their power.
During the period from 1837 to 1870, however, equity courts began to
emphasize that the right to an injunction was not automatic. In Ingraham
v. Dunnell,5' the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, deciding
a nuisance suit in which a mill owner sought to enjoin the construction
of a printing factory, admitted that "courts of equity are invested with
large discretionary powers." 52 In 1862, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in Parker v. Winzipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Manufactur-
ing Co.,53 also acknowledged the discretionary powers of the chancellor.
"[A] Court of Chancery," the Court stated, "will not, as of course,
51. 46 Mass. (5 Met.) 118 (1842).
52. Id. at 123.
53. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 545 (1862). See also Rosser v. Randolph, 7 Port. 238 (Ala.
1838); Clack v. White, 32 Tenn. 540, 545 (1852).
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interpose by injunction. It will consider all the circumstances, the conse-
quences of such action, and the real equity of the case." 54 In connection
with this open acknowledgement of the existence of equitable discretion,
the courts often stressed the harshness of the equitable remedies, par-
ticularly of the injunction.5 5 The growing self-awareness on the part of
equity courts of the discretionary nature of their power may have been
a major cause of the great reliance on procedural doctrines during this
period.
Application of the Equitable Maxims
Long and Clearly Established Right
The broad statement made by many courts during this period that
the chancellor would protect a complainant only if a long and undis-
puted right was shown to have been violated was a significant vestige of
the extreme reluctance of the earlier period to grant an injunction in a
nuisance action. Within the rubric of this maxim, some courts appeared
to require a prior judgment at law establishing the rights and violations
of these rights,5" but most decisions that applied the maxim merely
required either a prior judgment or a clear showing of the existence of
the right and of its violation. 57 In Porter v. Withan,58 a Maine court
stated the maxim in a case in which the complainant was seeking to
enjoin a dam as a nuisance: "There can be no doubt that, it would be un-
just to destroy property or the use of it before it has been determined by a
judicial decision or by lapse of time, that the owner [defendant] can
have no such right as he claims and enjoys." " This willingness to look
at the merits was more apparent than real, however, because the chancel-
lor rarely found that a sufficient showing had been made.
54. 67 U.S. at 553.
55. A New York court, in denying injunctive relief in a nuisance case, wrote: "a
much stronger case must be presented, and the impending danger more imminent and
more impressive than this complaint ... to justify us in the application of these severe
and coercive measures . . . ." Drake v. Hudson River R.R., 7 Barb. 508, 551 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1849). "[Tihe jurisdiction of the Courts of Equity to interfere, by injunction
is of recent origin, and is always exercised sparingly and with great caution . . .
Simpson v. Justice, 43 N.C. 115, 129 (1851).
56. See, e.g., Ray v. Lynes, 10 Ala. 63 (1846); Hudson & Del. Canal Co. v. New
York & Erie R.R., 9 Paige's Ch. 323 (N.Y. 1841); Carpenter v. Cummings, 2 Phila.
74 (Pa. C. P. 1857).
57. See, e.g., Green v. Oakes, 17 I11. 249 (1855); Jordan v. Woodward, 38 Maine 424
(1854); Robeson v. Pittenger, 2 N.J. Eq. 57 (1838).
58. 17 Maine 292 (1840).
59. Id. at 294.
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Little effort was expended by the courts in explaining the reasoning
underlying the maxim. The requirement of a clear, undisputed right
made some sense if a case involved a dispute concerning the existence of
an easement or prescriptive right. In nuisance actions, however, the plain-
tiff's right to enjoy his property was absolute, not limited by time. On
its face, the substantive law of nuisance protected any use or enjoyment
of property regardless of its length or nature. This apparent right, how-
ever, was significantly diluted by the reluctance of courts to enjoin
those perpetrating nuisances without a showing of clear and undisputed
rights. A possible rationalization of this requirement might be protection
of the defendant's right to a trial by jury, which he would be denied in
the chancery court. This was alluded to in at least some of the cases,60
but must be contrasted with the great willingness of the courts during
this period to enjoin other actions without a previous trial at law."'
This procedural device ostensibly was merely a delaying tactic. Pre-
sumably, a disappointed equity complainant could become a plaintiff at
law and, after obtaining a judgment declaring the defendant's activity to
be a nuisance, return to the equity court and procure an injunction. The
entrepreneur, however, could receive two benefits by the application
of the doctrine that a clear, undisputed right was a prerequisite to equity
jurisdiction. On a practical level, he could take advantage of the com-
plainant's weaker bargaining position and force an out-of-court settle-
ment or, alternatively, depend on delays in the law court to discourage
the complainant, perhaps inducing him to move or simply desist. Apart
from this, the entrepreneur reasonably could expect that even if the
complainant were able to obtain a judgment at law he might not be
granted an injunction. Although very few complainants actually came
back into equity after gaining a law judgment,6 2 they hardly could be en-
couraged by the flat statement of several courts, including the Supreme
Court of the United States, that "many cases of private nuisance will
60. Thebaut & Glazier v. Canova, 11 Fla. 143 (1867); Dana v. Valentine, 46 Mass.
(5 Met.) 8 (1842); cf. Middleton v. Franklin, 3 Cal. 238 (1853); Coe v. Winnipiseogee
Lake Cot. & Wool. Mfg. Co., 37 N.H. 254 (1858).
61. The third American edition of Eden on Injunctions cites many instances of courts
of this period enjoining waste, patent infringement and copyright infringement without a
prior hearing at law. See R. EDEN, supra note 49. These cases never expressed any
qualms concerning the lack of prior jury verdict.
62. In New Albany & Salem R.R. v. Higman, 18 Ind. 77 (1862), the plaintiff already
had obtained a judgment at law declaring the defendant to be operating a nuisance
and awarding damages to the plaintiff. Injunctive relief was denied on the basis of
statutory justification. See notes 144-53 infra & accompanying text.
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sustain an action at law which will not justify relief in equity." 63
Another court, -in 1849, stressing the recent origin of the injunctive
power in nuisance cases, stated that "a much stronger case must be pre-
sented, and the impending danger more imminent and more impressive
than this complaint ... to justify us in the application of these severe
and coercive measures ... ,, 64 Thus, the injunctive remedy was fore-
closed without even an examination of the possibility of the existence of
a nuisance. Courts enunciating this cryptic standard did little to expand
or explain the criteria that were applicable to determine which types of
nuisance claims did merit injunction.
Some courts used the requirement of a long and undisputed right as
a springboard to a more frankly prodevelopmental procedural rule. After
stating the maxim, the courts attempted to justify it. In Wilder v. Strick-
land 65 a complainant landowner sought to enjoin the construction of a
mill that allegedly would cause severe flooding and generally unhealthy
conditions. After describing the injunction as an extraordinary remedy,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina refused to grant it because no in-
jury had been alleged "as will justify the Court in denying to the neigh-
borhood the convenience of a public mill which will grind all the
year." 616 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Georgia held in Harrison v.
Brooks,6 7 a suit to enjoin construction of a livery stable alleged to be a
nuisance, that equity is "less disposed to interfere, when the apprehended
mischief is to follow from such establishments and erections as have a
tendency to promote the public convenience." 68 These courts trans-
formed the dilatory device embodied in the original maxim into a
mechanism for the permanent denial of injunctive relief. Although this
prodevelopmental application of the equity maxim did not amount to
the explicit balancing test of a later era, the extreme respect that the
chancellor paid to the entrepreneur provided an indication of later de-
velopments in the law of nuisance.
Only one court during the period actually adopted an explicit balanc-
ing test to determine the propriety of injunctive relief in a nuisance case.
In Grey v. Ohio & Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,69 a farmer sought to
63. Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cot. & Wool. Mfg. Co., 67 U.S. (2 Black) 545, 553
(1862).
64. Drake v. Hudson River R.R., 7 Barb. 508, 551 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849).
65. 55 N.C. 386 (1856).
66. Id. at 391.
67. 20 Ga. 537 (1856).
68. Id.
69. 1 Grant Cas. 412 (Pa. 1856).
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enjoin the proposed construction of the railroad. The court, after deter-
mining that little damage would be done to the farmer, stated that
"[u]nder such circumstances the rule in equity requires the court to
balance the inconveniences likely to be incurred by the respective par-
ties, by means of the action of the court, and to grant the injunction, or
withhold it, according to a sound discretion." 70 It is apparent that the
balancing test was framed in Grey in much narrower terms than those
in which the courts praised the general value of manufacturing or entre-
preneurial investment. The court in Grey focused on the actual harm
done to the individual entrepreneur rather than on the value or detriment
to the general populace. 71
Equity Will Not Aid Those Who Sleep on Their Rights
Another convenient procedural rationalization that protected the en-
trepreneur defendant during this period invoked the equitable maxim
that the chancellor will not aid those who sleep on their rights. In Dana
v. Valentine72 Richard Henry Dana and a group of his neighbors sought
to enjoin the construction of a soap and candle factory. The defendant,
who had operated the business for five years, was planning to rebuild
the factory, which recently had been destroyed by fire. The complaint
alleged that operation of the business filled the plaintiffs' dwelling houses
with "noisome, noxious and offensive vapors, fumes and stenches" and as
a consequence the plaintiffs had been unable to sell their houses. Accord-
ingly, the plaintiffs prayed for an injunction against the continuation of
the business. After venturing an opinion that the facts proved did not
support the allegations, the court rested its decision on the creation of
prescriptive rights. The court found that by permitting the use of the
defendant's land as a factory, the plaintiffs had, in effect, granted an ease-
70. Id. at 413.
71. Some courts employed a.balancing test in public nuisance cases as well during
this period. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Reed, 34 Pa. 275 (1859). But see Works v.
Junction R.R., 30 F. Cas. 626 (No. 18,046) (C.C.D. Ohio 1853). For example, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, in an 1844 suit to enjoin the construction of a
millpond, wrote that "there is nothing to shew us that there is so great a disproportion
between the private suffering and the public convenience, as would authorize the
court to interfere." Attorney Gen. ex rel. Bradsher v. Lea's Heirs, 38 N.C. 301, 305
(1844). The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in 1845, sending a private plaintiff to
state officials so that a public suit might be brought, wrote: "For such an injury it is
for the government to interfere, and not a private individual. The court could then
look at the rights of the whole community, and not, as in the present case, to those of
a single individual." O'Brien v. Norwich & Worcester R.R., 17 Conn. 372, 376 (1845).
72. 46 Mass. (5 Met.) 8 (1842).
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ment. This establishment of an easement to create a nuisance was curious,
particularly in light of the lack of damage caused by the factory until
soon before the action was commenced. The court explained the anomaly
by asserting that the plaintiffs previously had been in a position "to main-
tain an action for the invasion of [their] rights, without proof of dam-
age." 73 The court remitted the plaintiffs to their action at law, which,
impliedly, would be adequate.
By permitting an entrepreneur to gain an easement by nuisance after
a relatively short period of time, the courts diluted substantially the ab-
solute property rights embodied in the substantive law of nuisance. Fur-
thermore, by determining that the sufferance of noxious fumes and
smells created an easement, the court in Dana burdened the complainant
with an easement that was a significant disruption of enjoyment of prop-
erty, rather than a minor physical incursion into his property rights such
as might be caused by a pathway or road. It should be noted that, in
Dana, the investment of the entrepreneur in the building and equipment
was reduced to a negligible factor because of the recent destruction by
fire. Thus, the defendant would not have been harmed seriously by the
grant of injunction.
Similarly the Supreme Court of North Carolina held laches to bar
injunctive relief to a homeowner who contended that a turpentine dis-
tillery was a nuisance.7 4 The complainant had filed suit immediately upon
the erection of the distillery, but, because it took five years for the chan-
cellor to hear the suit, presumably for failure to diligently prosecute,
an injunction was denied.75
Equity Will Give Relief Only When the Legal Remedy is Inade-
quate
Another equitable maxim relied upon to deny injunctive relief was
that equity jurisdiction was limited to cases in which legal relief would
be inadequate. One court's dictum went so far as to state that in private
nuisance cases there is always an adequate remedy at law.76 If this had
been adopted as a rule of decision by a significant number of courts,
73. Id. at 14.
74. Simpson v. Justice, 43 N.C. 115 (1851).
75. For other courts during this period applying the laches argument, see Tichenor v.
Wilson, 8 N.J. Eq. 197 (1849); Foster v. Norton, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 390 (Athens
County Dist. Ct. 1860); Warren v. Hunter, 1 Phila. 414 (Pa. C.P. 1853); cf. Coker v.
Birge, 9 Ga. 425 (1851).
76. Simpson v. Justice, 43 N.C. 115, 120 (1851).
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equitable jurisdiction over nuisances would have been eliminated en-
tirely. In reality, however, though several courts cited this ancient
maxim77 as authority for denial of injunctive relief, few, if any, dis-
cussed its particular relevance in a nuisance case or relied upon it as a
sole ground for denial of recovery. An instructive example is Middleton
v. Franklin.78 In that case, the plaintiff, an upstairs tenant, sought to
enjoin the defendant from the proposed construction of a steam engine,
a furnace, and a boiler in the basement of the house. In addition to the
great hazard that assertedly would be created by the small factory, the
complainant charged that the great noise and diminution of the value
of his leasehold would impair his enjoyment of his leasehold. In a very
short opinion, the Supreme Court of California stated that "to entitle a
party to an injunction in a case of nuisance, the injury to be sustained
must be such as cannot adequately be compensated by damages . . . ." ,7
Without any elaboration or attempt to apply the facts of the specific
case to the standard, the court concluded that "the remedy at common
law is ample." " Significantly the court did not rely solely on the equi-
table maxim but asserted also that no injunction would be granted if only
a possibility of nuisance in the proposed building existed. Similarly, in
Spooner v. McConnell,8l Justice McLean denied an injunction to a
property owner seeking to bar the construction of several dams by de-
fendant. The court relied on the availability to the plaintiff of adequate
relief in a damage suit at law, but coupled this ground of decision with
reliance on the distinction between public and private nuisance. 82 The
claimant, the court held, had not shown special damages sufficient to
maintain this action against a public nuisance.
In Coe v. Winnepiseogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Manufacturing
Co.,&3 the plaintiff sought to enjoin operation of the defendant's dam,
which had repeatedly overflowed and flooded the plaintiff's land. The
court denied equitable relief, stating: "The destruction of the plaintiff's
grass and timber; the deterioration of his land; the throwing it open to
cattle, thus rendering additional fences necessary, and the obstruction to
77. "Inadequacy of a remedy at law is the foundation stone upon which equity juris-
prudence rests .... " De Soto Falls Dev. Co. v. Libby, 231 Ala. 507, 508, 165 So. 763, 764
(1936).
78. 3 Cal. 238 (1853).
79. Id. at 241.
80. Id.
81. 22 F. Cas. 939 (No. 13,245) (C.C.D. Ohio 1838).
82. See notes 97-106 infra & accompanying text.
83. 37 N.H. 254 (1858).
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the passage of logs... are the usual consequences ... for which consequen-
tial damages may be recovered, and for which adequate compensation may
be given at law. They are not of that ruinous and irremediable character
to constitute a case of pressing necessity for arresting them." 8' This reli-
ance on the adequate remedy at law precept is inconsistent with the
well established equitable principle that real estate is unique and is not
adequately compensated for by recovery of damages."5 Utilization of
this maxim reflected the growing realization by American courts of the
19th century that in some cases property may be fungible, rather than
unique.8 6 The inadequacy of the damage remedy at law, without removal
of the nuisance itself, in most instances should have been obvious: the
damages would continue. As one commentator early in the 20th cen-
tury remarked: "From the very nature of the acts causing the injury,
we can hardly imagine a case of nuisance in which an action for damages
is an adequate remedy." 87
The failure of the courts to rely on this maxim to any greater extent
was an implicit recognition of its weakness. In fact the Supreme Court
of Tennessee, in Clack v. White,88 frankly acknowledged that no ade-
quate legal remedy existed in nuisance suits, noting that property
interests, unquantifiable in damages, were always at stake in such cases.
The plaintiff in Clack sought to enjoin the obstruction of his right-of-
way as a private nuisance; the defendant asserted that the plaintiff had
an adequate remedy at law in damages. The Tennessee court rejected
the defendant's reasoning, stating: "It is clear, that the remedy at law,
for a private nuisance, is imperfect and inadequate, and that a complete
and perfect remedy can only be had in a court of equity."8 9
Procedural Defenses in Nuisance
The Harmless Building Defense
During the mid-19th century, several courts, citing an early 19th-
century decision by Chancellor Kent of New York,9" denied injunctive
84. Id. at 264.
85. See Kitchen v. Herring, 42 N.C. 190 (1850). Equity adopted this principle "not
because [land] was fertile or rich in minerals ... but because it was land-a favorite and
favored subject in England, and every country of Anglo-Saxon origin." Id. at 192.
86. Horwitz, Transformation in the Conception of Property in American Law,
1780-1860, 40 U. C. L. REv. 248 (1973).
87. Lewis, supra note 39, at 289.
88. 32 Tenn. 540 (1852). See also Dennis v. Eckhardt, 3 Grant Cas. 389 (Pa. 1862).
89. 32 Tenn. at 543-44.
90. People v. Sands, 1 Johns. 78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806). In this case, decided while
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relief in nuisance cases on the ground that equity would enjoin only
actual nuisances and not prospective ones. The reasoning of the courts
was that because equity would enjoin nuisances only "if a private person
... is in imminent danger of suffering a special injury," 91 the proposed
erection of a building caused no imminent danger. Courts that applied
this reasoning, generally in situations in which a factory was to be con-
structed, developed a dichotomy between per se nuisances and other
speculative nuisances. Most decisions held that if a proposed building
was to be of particularly noxious quality and would be a nuisance in
whatever manner it was operated, it was a per se nuisance and, there-
fore, enjoinable even before construction or completion. 92 Most suits,
however, resulted in findings that the building was not per se a nuisance
and its erection, therefore, was nonenjoinable. This prodevelopmental
attitude encouraged the construction of buildings. Presumably, the con-
struction itself would confer some economic benefit on the community
even if the factory or business as operated proved to be enjoinable as a
nuisance.
In Rhodes v. Dunbar,9" a group of homeowners sought to enjoin the
rebuilding of the defendant's planing mill. The mill, which shortly
before had been destroyed by fire, previously had produced great
amounts of soot, smoke, noise, and dirt. Although apparently conceding
that operation of the mill formerly had constituted a nuisance, the court
refused to enjoin the rebuilding. The Rhodes court admitted that there
were some per se nuisances, such as pigsties and glue factories, the con-
Kent was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New York, the defendant was indicted
for maintaining a public nuisance by storing 50 barrels of gunpowder in his ammunition
house. Kent wrote "the fears of mankind will not alone create a nuisance . . . " Id. at
90. See also Ramsey v. Riddle, 20 F. Cas. 212 (No. 11,544) (C.C.D.C. 1806).
91. Smith v. Cummings, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. 92 (Pa. C.P. 1851).
92. Courts usually cited glue factories, pig sties and similar obnoxious trades as per se
nuisances. Cf. Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa. 274 (1868). The list of per se nuisances, how-
ever, was never exactly the same in all jurisdictions. Com pare Cheatham v. Shearon,
31 Tenn. 213 (1851) (finding a gunpowder storage house to be a per se nuisance), witb
People v. Sands, I Johns. 78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806) (finding a similar building not to
be a nuisance). The Louisiana court enjoined the construction of a brick kiln, pre-
sumably as a nuisance per se, Fuselier v. Spalding, 2 La. Ann. 773 (1847), and the
Georgia court enjoined a livery stable, Coker v. Birge, 9 Ga. 425 (1851). Alabama,
however, refused to enjoin the construction of a blacksmith shop, Ray v. Lynes, 10
Ala. 63 (1846) and a Pennsylvania trial court, in contrast to the later dicta of its own
supreme court in Rhodes v. Dunbar supra, refused to enjoin the proposed construction
of a glue factory. Smith v. Cummings, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. 92 (Pa. C.P. 1851). For other
courts applying this device, see Thebaut & Glazier v. Canova, 11 Fla. 143 (1867);
Simpson v. Justice, 43 N.C. 115 (1851).
93. 57 Pa. 274 (1868).
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struction of which could be enjoined, nevertheless, the court refused
injunctive relief because the primary objection of the plaintiffs, the risk
of fire, was merely "speculative." The court also recognized that, on the
basis of the Rhodes complaint, all industrial construction could have been
enjoined since the danger of fire is an inherent risk in the operation of
any business enterprise. Given the concern courts of this era expressed
for industrialization," such a result would be unthinkable. As one court
concluded: "[I]f we should establish any other rule we might be com-
pelled to stop much of the business, now safely carried on in the midst
of our populous city." 95
At least one court carried the refusal to enjoin a speculative nuisance to
its logical extreme. In Dumesnil v. Dupont,96 the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky refused a homeowner's bill to enjoin the defendants from
operating a powder storage facility unattended. The court conceded that
this operation was a great danger and, therefore, a nuisance. It dismissed
the plaintiff's bill, however, as speculative on the grounds that there had
been no actual damage to the plaintiff; no nuisance could be shown
without a physical injury. A broad reading of Dumesnil would have
emasculated the substantive law of nuisance.
The Public Nuisance Defense
The common law long had recognized the distinction between a pub-
lic and a private nuisance97 and traditionally had allowed private individ-
uals to recover damages only if a private nuisance was proved.98 Thus,
94. See notes 123-43 infra & accompanying text.
95. Carpenter v. Cummings, 2 Phila. 74 (Pa. C.P. 1857).
96. 57 Ky. 637, 18 B. Mon. 800 (1858).
97. Blackstone, writing in 1768, had distinguished between public and private nuisances.
He stated that the sole remedy for a public nuisance was an indictment with the
exception that "when a private person suffers some extraordinary damage, beyond the
rest of the king's subjects', by a public nuisance: in which case he shall have a private
satisfaction by action." 3 W. BLAcKsTo.;E, supra note 10 at *220. Professor William
Prosser traced nuisance in general back to the time of Bracton and Glanville and
public nuisance as a separate, unrelated concept into the 13th arid 14th centuries.
Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. Rv. 997, 998-99 (1966). For
another view of the origins of nuisance law, see Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Indus-
trial Revolution, 3 J. LEG. SrvUD. 403-08 (1974).
98. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *220. In one of the few private suits for
injunction in England during the 18th century, the chancellor denied relief to the
plaintiff, asserting that, "if a public nuisance, it should be an information in the name
of the Attorney-General, and then it would be for his consideration, whether he would
file such an information or not. .. " Baines v. Baker, 27 Eng. Rep. 105, Amb. 158 (Ch.
1752).
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when the injunction became recognized as a possible remedy in nuisance
cases, courts generally denied private individuals injunctive relief against
public nuisances unless special damage was alleged and proved. 9 The
courts, in their willingness to shield the entrepreneur from the injunction,
significantly broadened the definition of public nuisance.
Early English common law decisions characterized public nuisance
as a low-grade criminal offense that generally encompassed the block-
ing of a public highway or a navigable stream. 100 Underlying the public
nuisance doctrine was the belief that, because the entire community was
harmed by the obstruction of the public way, representatives of the
public should seek the remedy. Of course, everyone in the com-
munity would not use any particular road at one time, so the damage
was more theoretical than actual. But because each member of
the public had the right to use the road or stream, a nuisance had
been committed by the impairment of that right. Even at classical
common law, however, a private party showing "greater hurt or
inconvenience than any other man" could maintain an action for
damages at law.101
During the mid-19th century, American courts, armed with hornbook
law requiring special damages to be shown for a private party to be en-
titled to relief against a public nuisance, began imperceptibly to expand
the class of public nuisances. For example, in Bigelow v. Hartford
Bridge Co.,10 2 heavily cited by other courts, the complainant asserted
that his land would be inundated in rainy weather if a bridge were re-
built. Without questioning this allegation, the court pointed to the
assertion in the complaint that several other properties in the area simi-
larly would be flooded to show that the nuisance, if any, was a public
99. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Norwich & Worcester R.R., 17 Conn. 372 (1845); Bigelow v.
Hartford Bridge Co., 14 Conn. 565 (1841); Alden v. Pinney, 12 Fla. 348 (1868); Allen v.
Board of Chosen Freeholders, 13 N.J. Eq. 68 (1860); Zabriskie v. Jersey City & Bergen
R.R., 13 NJ. Eq. 314 (1861); Higgins v. the Mayor & Common Council, 8 N.J. Eq.
309 (1850); First Baptist Church v. Utica & Schenectady R.R., 6 Barb. 313 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1848); Frizzle v. Patrick, 59 N.C. 354 (1863). In Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge,
17 N.H. 200 (1845), the court invoked the public nuisance defense on behalf of the
defendant against a municipality, which was held to be the improper representative to
bring suit against a public nuisance. See also Mayor v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 91 (1838).
100. Prosser, supra note 97, at 999.
101. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *220. This principle was accepted in American
law as well. See Abbott v. Mills, 3 Vt. 521 (1831); Burrows v. Pixly, 1 Root 362
(Conn. 1792).
102. 14 Conn. 56S (1841).
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nuisance not remediable by a private party without a showing of special
damages.
The facts of Bigelow were quite different from the usual facts in
public nuisance suits in which a public road or stream was being blocked.
Unlike typical nuisance actions that involved interference with the rights
of every member of the public, Bigelow involved litigation concerning
merely an aggregation of several private nuisances. The court added to-
gether these several private nuisances and concluded that they consti-
tuted one public nuisance. Of course, under this theory the defendant
progressively improved his defenses to litigation by inflicting more
damage over a wider territory. Similarly, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, in Frizzle v. Patrick,10 3 refused to enjoin a defendant whose
millpond was, after construction, likely to flood the land of several ad-
joining land owners. The court, rather than relying on the speculative
nature of the nuisance, simply described it as a public nuisance and im-
plied that no private party, under any circumstances, could seek relief
against it.10 4
The transformation of the definition of a public nuisance was recog-
nized implicitly by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1866.
In Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co.,105 the plaintiff sought damages in nuis-
ance for the defendant's operation of a triphammer near plaintiff's home.
The defendant asserted the public nuisance defense, claiming that be-
cause many other individuals in the immediate area would suffer the
same kind of damage, this was a public nuisance. The court recognized
that there were two types of public nuisance. The first, which was not
remediable by a private party without special damages being shown,
was an injury to a common right, like the use of a highway or canal.
This was the traditional type of public nuisance recognized by the
common law of England. The second category of public nuisance was
an injury to the enjoyment of private property or private health,
remediable by private parties, though within the authority of public
officials as protectors of the aggregate health. An injury to the health or
property of an individual "is in its nature special and peculiar, and does
not cause a damage which can properly be said to be common or public,
however numerous may be the cases of similar damage arising from the
same cause." '06 The court here, perhaps unknowingly, was pointing out
103. 59 N.C. 354 (1863).
104. Id.
105. 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 95 (1866).
106. Id. at 103.
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the great expansion that had occurred in the definition of public nuisance
by courts eager to protect the entrepreneur.
By requiring that actions to enjoin public nuisances be brought by
governmental officials, the courts helped the entrepreneur: prospective
plaintiffs would have a political gauntlet to run in order to urge govern-
ment officials to bring suit. Even if a plaintiff could convince local offi-
cials to seek injunctive relief, the court very well might require state
officials to bring the action. This was precisely the case in Mayor v.
Alexandria Canal Co. 10 7 The Supreme Court of the United States held
that the mayor and councilmen were improper representatives of the
citizens of a town seeking to enjoin an aqueduct asserted to be a nuisance.
One reason to require the state officials to bring the action would be to
present to the court an opportunity to balance the rights and good of
the public against any private injury. As one court wrote: "For such an
injury it is for the government to interfere, and not a private individual.
The court could then look at the rights of the whole community, and not
to those of a single individual." '1
A notable reluctance to find special damages typified court decisions
of this period. In Alden v. Pinney'0 9 the defendant was prepared to build
an ice house that partially would block access to plaintiff's home. The
court, noting that the defendant proposed to erect the structure in shoal
water, declared that it was, at worst, a public nuisance and that the
plaintiff had not shown special damages sufficient to warrant the issu-
ance of an injunction.
Substantive Law from 1837 to 1870
Remnants of the 18tb Century
Although formulated almost a century earlier in a predominantly
agrarian society, Blackstone's definition of nuisance heavily influenced
American courts of the mid-19th century. An actionable nuisance, in
Blackstone's words, "signifies anything that worketh hurt, inconve-
nience, or damage." 110 A private nuisance, he continued, is "anything
done to the hurt or annoyance of the lands, tenements, or hereditaments
107. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91 (1838).
108. O'Brien v. Norwich & Worcester R.R., 17 Conn. 372, 376 (1845).
109. 12 Fla. 348 (1868).
110. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at '216. Wood described a nuisance as when
one "doth any thing upon his own ground, to the unlawful hurt or annoyance of his
neighbor." T. WooD, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (9th ed. 1763).
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of another." I" American courts viewed this definition as a mere particu-
larization of the general doctrine of the maxim sic utere." In formula-
tion as well as in application, the traditional definition of nuisance was
strict both from the plaintiff's and the defendant's point of view.
For the plaintiff, the strict formulation of the traditional doctrine
meant that any injury or inconvenience, unless limited by a standard of
de minimis non curat lex, would be actionable. Thus, in Cooper v. Ran-
dall,13 the Supreme Court of Illinois stated that even if smoke entered a
plaintiff's house from the defendant's flour mill, or caused the plaintiff
inconvenience one day each year, an actionable nuisance existed. The
courts entertained no thought of balancing the interests of defendant and
plaintiff to define an actionable harm to the plaintiff. No comparison
was required of the small degree of harm caused to the plaintiff with the
great deal of harm or cost that would be inflicted on the defendant upon
a finding of nuisance. Even if some minimal physical intrusion could be
demonstrated, so that the issue could be addressed as one of physical
trespass, courts viewed the case in a nuisance framework.
The traditional definition imposed strict liability, ignoring any con-
sideration of the care and caution that the defendant, using and exercising
his own property rights, was expending. In Scott v. Bay," 4 for example,
a homeowner sued a defendant for the damage caused by rock quarrying
activities conducted near the plaintiff's home. The plaintiff's complaint
was framed in both trespass and case," 5 because not only had the quarry-
ing caused noise and commotion, but also some of the defendant's rocks
had been thrown onto the plaintiff's property. The defendant requested
jury instructions that would release him from liability "if ...proper
precautions were used in working the quarries . . . ." "' The language
was rejected by the court, which asserted that such care and precaution
provided "no vindication" for the defendant's conduct in causing the
nuisance to the plaintiff. Adoption of the defendant's assertion would
have imported into the law of nuisance a negligence standard attractive
to the entrepreneur; such a standard, however, was not imposed until the
late 19th century.
111. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *216.
112. See note 17 supra & accompanying text.
113. 53 II. 24 (1869).
114. 3 Md. 431 (1853).
115. An action on the case was the traditional remedy at common law for damages
based on nuisance. See 3 V. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *220. This English remedy
was transported early into American law. Nichols v. Pixly, 1 Root 129 (Conn. 1789);
Burrows v. Pixly, I Root 362 (Conn. 1792).
116. 3 Md. at 445.
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Only one court during this period purported to adopt a standard of
nuisance liability based on fault. In 1851, the Supreme Court of Con-
necticut held that a defendant could be held liable for a nuisance only if
he were at fault.17 In applying a fault standard to the facts of the case,
the court found a defendant blacksmith liable, holding that fault was
demonstrated by his incorrect choice of place to conduct his business." 8
This was not the kind of negligence standard for which the entrepreneur
had hoped; rather, he had sought to be held blameless for damage or
interference caused while operating his business in the most reasonable
manner possible in the light of current business practice and scientific
technology applicable to the trade.
The strict substantive law of nuisance during the years 1837 to 1870
hardly could have provided much encouragement to the entrepreneur
seeking to avoid the chancellor's iron hand. However, the cases in which
the courts laid down the traditional strict formulation of nuisance law
were suits for damages. Although successful damage suits could be an-
noying, the entrepreneur could spread the cost of litigation, as well as of
the judgments themselves, among investors or consumers, without suffer-
ing any permanent interruption of business operations.
Few courts considering anti-entrepreneurial injunction suits announced
and applied the traditional strict substantive law of nuisance. The use of
the sic utere maxim in a few isolated cases can be explained by extraneous
factors. In Brower v. Mayor,"9 the court warned that "the great injunc-
tion of the law, addressed to all proprietors of real estate is 'so use your
own, as not to injure another' .... ., 120 This was an unusual case: New
York City, defendant in its proprietary capacity, was attempting to con-
struct an immigration receiving station in the midst of a predominantly
residential section of the city. Although the grant of the injunction
halted construction, the city was not cast in the role of the entrepreneur.
In Wolcott v. Melick,121 the Blackstone definition was used but the court
was swift to deny the injunction on procedural grounds because of a lack
of showing of irreparable injury by the plaintiff. Two other courts used
the sic utere formulation while deciding injunction suits between two
entrepreneurs. 122
117. Whitney v. Bartholomew, 21 Conn. 213 (1851).
118. Id. at 217-18.
119. 3 Barb. 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848).
120. Id. at 257.
121. II N.J. Eq. 204 (1856).
122. Goker v. Birge, 9Ga. 425 (1851); Burditt v. Swenson, 17 Tex. 489 (1856).
644 [Vol. 17:621
NUISANCE INJUNCTIONS
Thus, though the courts defined nuisance strictly, they often avoided
application of substantive nuisance law in suits seeking an injunction
against an entrepreneur. Apparently, in actions for injunctions a different
type of thinking operated to determine the existence of a nuisance than
in damage suits.
Substantive Law in Injunction Suits
Because the Blackstone definition was part of the legal orthodoxy
of the period, courts were loath to articulate separate rules for determin-
ing the existence of a nuisance in suits for injunctions and in suits for
damages. Most of these courts, therefore, when considering anti-entre-
preneurial injunctions, simply ignored the traditional definition. Sic
utere, if mentioned at all, was invoked solely for purposes of disparage-
ment. In 1854, the Court of Appeals of New York, in Auburn & Cato
Plank-road Co. v. Douglass,1 3 stated: "While, therefore, sic utere tuo,
etc. may be a very good moral precept, it is utterly useless as a legal
maxim .... , Similarly, two years earlier, a New York court, in Hertz
v. Long Island Railroad Co.,125 had warned that if the maxim "should be
applied literally, it would deprive us to a great extent of the legitimate
use of our property, and impair, if not destroy its value." 12, Pronounce-
ments like these were hardly startling and rather predictable when
uttered by the highest court in a burgeoning, industrialized state. A
relaxation of the substantive law of nuisance in favor of the entrepre-
neur, however, was not limited to the industrial Northeast.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in Lexington & Ohio Railroad v.
Applegate,127 issued the frankest acknowledgment of the special con-
sideration the entrepreneur received in the determination of the existence
of a nuisance in injunction suits. Suit was brought by 43 homeowners
and shopowners in Louisville to halt the operation of a newly constructed
railroad that, as the court hastened to point out, carried about 550 pas-
sengers daily at a price much less than the fare normally charged for
the cabs of the town. The railroad had been erected pursuant to authority
in a charter granted by the state legislature. Though the court could have
relied on this statutory authority as a defense to the injunction action, 28
123. 9 N.Y. 444 (1854).
124. Id. at 445. A cynic might suggest that the reason the rule was considered useless
was that it led, in the court's mind, to the wrong result.
125. 13 Barb. 646 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852).
126. Id. at 658.
127. 38 Ky. (8 Dana) 289 (1839).
128. See notes 144-53 inf ra & accompanying text.
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it purposefully sought more fundamental grounds to justify a denial of
the injunction.
Reviewing the substantive law of nuisance, the court broadly stated
that "even though some persons owning property on the railroad street,
may be subjected to some inconvenience, and even loss, by the construc-
tion and use of the road, yet-if the use made of the road be consistent
with the purpose for which the street was established, and also consistent
with the just rights of all-such persons have no right, either to damages,
or to an injunction .... , 129 Although this was not the explicit interest-
balancing analysis that courts later in the century would adopt, the
opinion was favorable to the entrepreneur.
To justify its analysis, the Kentucky court wrote, "the onward spirit
of the age must, to a reasonable extent, have its way. The law is made
for the times, and will be made or modified by them ... railroads and
locomotive steam cars-the offsprings, as they will also be the parents,
of progressive improvement-should not, in themselves, be considered as
nuisances, although, in ages that are gone, they might have been so held,
because they would have been completely useless, and therefore more
mischievous." 130 That a court in a rural state like Kentucky was willing
to state openly so pro-entrepreneurial an interpretation of the substantive
issue indicates that this same instrumental viewpoint of the law must
have influenced other courts of this period.
Although no other decision admitted its bias and loosened the strict
law of nuisances as openly as Applegate, a separate standard of decision,
129. 38 Ky. at 301. By rejecting any possibility of damages, the court made it clear
it was deciding the case on substantive grounds.
130. Id. at 309. One court during this period did apply a frank balancing test in a
trespass case. Writing for the Supreme Court of Georgia, Justice Joseph H. Lumpkin
tated:
Under these circumstances ...seeing the state in which the law appears
to stand, without, however, expressing any opinion upon it, and considering
that by granting the injunction, I shall be stopping the working of a mine,
a thing which of all others this Court is most averse to do; (though it may,
under certain circumstances, be compelled to do it;) considering, also,
the great expense which has been incurred, and the great injury which, if
the Court should turn out to be wrong, would be inflicted on the party
claiming the right to work the mine; and, on the other hand, the nature
of the injury, which the plaintiff may sustain, if he turns out to be right,
I have to determine whether-balancing the question between these two
parties, and the extent of inconvenience likely to be incurred on the one
side and on the other-it is the most proper exercise of the jurisdiction of
the Court to grant the injunction or to withhold it.
Water Lot v. Bucks, 5 Ga. 315, 327 (1848).
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or at least a different judicial attitude, that weighed the value of indus-
trialization, was being applied to the anti-entrepreneurial injunction suit.
In Ross v. Butler,'' the New Jersey chancellor, ruling on an action
brought by two homeowners seeking to enjoin the operation of a pot-
tery, weighed the relative value of the defendant's business against the
detriment to the community of that activity, asking whether it would
be, "in that neighborhood, and to these complainants, a nuisance." 132
Notably the court enjoined the entrepreneur, despite the espousal of a
less strict definition of nuisance. In injunction suits, the courts seemed
much more anxious to view the nuisance in its surrounding context than
to concentrate on the injury being suffered by the plaintiff. Blackstone
had written that a person whose business caused injury should move,
despite the public worth of his occupation. 3 3 Ross implicitly rejected
Blackstone's thesis, noting that "it is a question of great practical im-
portance in this state, where manufactures flourish, and are on the
increase, whether such business can be permitted in the neighborhood of
dwelling-houses .... ,, 134
The courts were quick to consider the general benefits to the com-
munity of industrialization. In a suit to enjoin the construction of a rail-
road and a wharf, in 1859 the Supreme Court of Florida, in Geiger v.
Filor,135 posed the following rhetorical question: "What would be the
position and situation of Key West, an island in the great ocean, with-
out her admirable and covenient wharves, giving free ingress and egress
to her citizens and strangers from all parts of the world and affording
almost unequalled facilities for loading and unloading vessels of the
greatest burthen?" 13 Predictably, the court found no nuisance.
These references show that courts of this era were conscious of the
role of the entrepreneur in the expansion of the American industrial
131. 19 N.J. Eq. 294 (1868).
132. Id. at 297.
133. It is a nuisance "if one's neighbor sets up and exercises any offensive trade; as
a tanner's, a tallow chandler's, or the like; for though these are lawful and necessary
trades, yet they should be exercised in remote places; for the rule is, sic utere tuo,
alienwn non laedas: this therefore is an actionable nuisance." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra
note 10, at *217. Viner's abridgement of English law criticized the decision, unpub-
lished elsewhere, in Rankett's Case. In that case, the court held that the "needfulness"
of candlemaking would excuse- the obnoxious odor it produced. The Abridgement
stated: "Whatever Necessity there may be that candles be made, it cannot be pre-
tended necessary to make them in a town." 16 .C. ViNsa, A GENERAL ABRiDGEMENT OF
LAW AND EQUITY 23 (1743).
134. 19 NJ. Eq. at 298.
135. 8 Fla. 325 (1859).
136. Id. at 332.
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economy. The inclusion of such abundant praise in suits to enjoin the
operations of various entrepreneurs indicates that special consideration
was being given the defendant's status as entrepreneur. Even where
there was no praise, some courts simply yielded to the inevitability of
industrialization. In Kirkman v. Handy,"7 the Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee stated that although "a livery stable in a town ... is, under any
circumstances, a matter of some inconvenience" '1 and an interruption
in the enjoyment of some property, this also would be true of many
other buildings that were indispensable and necessary in towns. These
courts did not rely, as they could have, on procedural reasons for the
denial of injunctions;'39 rather, they held entrepreneurs blameless by
generously applying the law of nuisance. Later in this period some courts
extended to damage actions this more tolerant attitude toward nuisance
law.1
40
A considerable residue of the traditional thinking about nuisances
continued despite the rejection of the Blackstonian and sic utere formu-
lations by the courts. For example, the New Jersey chancellor, after
speaking of the great importance of manufactures to his state the year
before in an injunction case,' 4 1 granted a partial injunction against a gas
light factory in Cleveland v. Citizens Gas Light Co. 4 2 He wrote that
"any interference with our neighbor in the comfortable enjoyment of
life, is a wrong which the law will redress." 14' Although doubting that
137. 30 Tenn. 406 (1850).
138. Id. at 409.
139. See notes 50-109 sipra & accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 39 Pa. 257 (1861), a damage action in
which the court approved, in dicta, the lower court's instructions to the jury, which
stated that a certain amount of offensive odor is unavoidably incident to the business
of producing gas and must be endured by the public. In the same year, the Supreme
Court of Ohio, in a damage action for nuisance against a utility company, required
that a material interference, in light of the experience of a "normal" person, was a
requirement for liability. Columbia Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Freeland, 12 Ohio St.
392 (1861).
During the 1860's, English courts began to use a much more defendant-oriented
standard in the determination of the existence of a nuisance. For example, in Bamford
v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 3 B. & S. 66 (Ex. 1862), the court wrote "those acts
necessary for the common and ordinary use of land . . . may be done, if conveniently
done, without subjecting those who do them to an action." Id. at 33, 3 B. & S. at 83.
See also St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 Eng. Rep. 1432, 11 H.L. Cas. 642
(H.L. 1865). The entire story of the transformation of nuisance law in England, which
is similar to the American experience, is told in Brenner, supra note 97.
141. Ross v. Butler, 19 N.J. Eq. 294 (1868). See notes 131-34 rupra & accompanying
text.
142. 20 N.J. Eq. 201 (1869).
143. Id. at 205.
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the defendant actually could operate the factory without it being a
nuisance, the chancellor refused the remainder of the injunction in order
to give the defendant such an opportunity.
To avoid the debilitating effects of the prohibitory injunction, the
entrepreneur could depend on unarticulated favorable treatment in the
determination of the existence of a nuisance. Most courts, believing that
industrialization was either a positive social good or an inevitable force,
would consider the defendant's status as an entrepreneur. Although the
entrepreneur was helped, to some degree, by this groping for a separate
standard for the industrialist, a more valuable aid to the entrepreneur was
a specific substantive defense that was developed by courts during this
period: statutory justification.
Statutory Justification as a Defense
Statutory justification 1" was the major substantive defense available to
the entrepreneur in injunction suits during the mid-19th century.145
Typically, it would be asserted in a homeowner's suit for injunction
against a railroad. 148 The gravamen of the plaintiff's bill usually would
144. This phrase was coined by Professor Morton J. Horwitz of Harvard Law
School. See M. Horwitz, supra note 20, at 350.
145. See, e.g., State v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421
(1855); Mayor v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91 (1838); Currier v. West-
Side Elev. Pat. Ry., 6 F. Cas. 990 (No. 3,493) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1869); Rupley v. Welch,
23 Cal. 452 (1863); New Albany & Salem R.R. v. Higman, 18 Ind. 77 (1862); Milburn v.
City of Cedar Rapids, 12 Iowa 246 (1861); Hinchman v. Paterson Horse, 17 N.J. Eq.
75 (1864); Delaware & Raritan Canal Co. v. Lee, 22 N.J.L. 243 (1849); People v. Kerr,
27 N.Y. 185 (1863); Davis v. Mayor, 14 N.Y. 506 (1856); Williams v. New York Cent.
R.R., 18 Barb. 222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854); Hodgkinson v. Long Island R.R., 4 Ed. Ch. 411
(N.Y. 1844); Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837); Com-
monwealth v. Reed, 34 Pa. 275 (1859); Stoughton v. State, 5 Wis. 291 (1856).
Statutory justification, as a concept, was not peculiar to this period. It was asserted
in an American case as early as 1789. In that case a defendant who had constructed a
gristmill that operated as a nuisance to his neighbor, asserted that the license he had
obtained to operate the mill was sufficient to protect him from any damage judgments.
The Connecticut court rejected this defense, writing: "the license, however it may
estop the town from proceeding against the dam as a common nuisance, it can be no
excuse or justification for an injury done to private property." Nichols v. Pixly, 1 Root
129, 130 (Conn. 1789). In Chancellor Kent's last opinion he invoked the statutory
justification defense to protect the builders of the Champlain Canal against an action
for trespass. Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315 (N.Y. 1823). For other early applica-
tions of the statutory justification defense, see Stevens v. Proprietors of the Middlesex
Canal, 12 Mass. 466 (1815); Scudder v. Trenton Del. Falls Co, 1 N.J. Eq. 694 (1832).
i46. See, e.g., Currier v. West-Side Elev. Pat. Ry, 6 F. Cas. 990 (No. 3,492)
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1869); New Albany & Salem R.R. v. Higman, 18 Ind. 77 (1862); Hinch-
man v. Paterson Horse R.R., 17 N.J. Eq. 75 (1864).
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be that a defendant was operating, or was about to operate, a nuisance
that interfered with plaintiff's comfortable and peaceful enjoyment of his
property. Because the railroad had been constructed pursuant to the
authority granted by the state or local authorities, the defendant would
contend that such a statutory creation could not be declared a nuisance.
An instructive decision is Williams v. New York Central Railroad
Co.,147 in which a landowner coupled a damage claim with an injunction
action. The damage claim alleged that there was an unconstitutional taking
of the plaintiff's property without compensation; the injunction com-
plaint alleged that the defendant operated a nuisance that not only
diminished the enjoyment and comfort he derived from his property,
but also seriously impaired the value of the property. The defense stated
succinctly: "Vhere the sovereign law grants the franchise and specifies
how it may be enjoyed, the right conferred is absolute, and the only obli-
gation imposed is not to do any unnecessary injury to another." 148 The
court, after determining any injury suffered by the plaintiff to be conse-
quential rather than direct, 149 stated the essence of the statutory justifica-
tion defense: "that which is authorized by an act of the legislature cannot
be a nuisance." 150 The court continued, "the annoyances of which
the plaintiff complains, are such as are frequently experienced by the
dwellers in populous towns and cities, from these and other analogous
causes; they are incident to their condition, and they must be endured
without redress ..." 151
Thus, when legislative action implemented industrial activity, the
entrepreneur successfully employed statutory justification to erect a
"reasonable use" or negligence defense, replacing the strict liability stan-
dard of the traditional nuisance law. The courts either implicitly or
explicitly held that the behavior of the defendant, which would have
been a nuisance at common law, was excused because the state or
sovereign had authorized it.
The most vivid example of such deference to the legislature was found
in mid-19th century litigation before the Supreme Court of the United
States. In Pemsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,152 Pennsyl-
147. 18 Barb. 222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854).
148. Id. at 241.
149. The distinction between consequential and direct damages was outlined clearly
by Chief Justice Joel Parker of Massachusetts in Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.)
418 (1823). See also Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cowen 146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828).
150. 18 Barb. at 245.
151. Id. at 247.
152. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851).
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vania, acting in its proprietary capacity, sought to enjoin the construction
of defendant's bridge. The state, having built several railways and canals
at public expense, claimed it would suffer irreparable harm if the defend-
ant's bridge were erected; the relatively low height of the bridge would
render the Ohio River almost nonnavigable so that ships could not
reach Pennsylvania transportation facilities further up the river. Treating
the complaint as one sounding in nuisance, the Court enjoined the work
as a private nuisance to Pennsylvania in its corporate capacity and ordered
the bridge to be built at a higher elevation. In 1854, three years after the
original decree, the bridge was blown down by a storm. When the pro-
prietors proposed to rebuild it according to its original specifications, the
state again sought an injunction. The Supreme Court denied the applica-
tion for a new injunction on the grounds that an intervening act of Con-
gress authorized construction of the bridge at the original height.'53 Thus,
the Court accepted the statutory justification as authority to build what
already had been declared a common law nuisance.
The statutory justification defense had two major implications for
the entrepreneur. It immediately protected him from an injunction if he
was operating under statutory authorization. Perhaps more important,
however, use of the negligence standard in cases based on statutory justi-
fication made a negligence standard more acceptable to courts, and may
have led to the general acceptance of that standard later in the century.
THE PERIOD 1871 TO 1916
The period between 1871 and 1916 witnessed the most remarkable
economic growth in American history; by 1889, the United States had
become the world's leading industrial nation. 54 Not only were old indus-
tries expanded, but also new industries, like mining and oil drilling, were
developed. For the first time, the value of manufactured goods exceeded
income from farm products.'55 Immigration and urbanization in-
creased;' -5 as the population center moved westward, natural resources
were used more extensively, and transportation became easier as the
nation was crossed by an expanded railway system.
Against this background of economic growth, the number of private
suits for nuisance injunctions increased, a phenomenon that did not go
153. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
154. D. NORTH, supra note 1, at 28.
155. G. Fim & J. REs, supra note 11, at 296.
156. Id. at 307, 311.
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unnoticed by contemporary commentators. 157 The increasing industriali-
zation and urbanization of the country contributed to the greater fre-
quency of these actions; more potential plaintiffs were created by a
greater concentration of population. Moreover, an increased probability
of success encouraged more plaintiffs to sue. Another factor contributing
to the greater number of suits was the increasingly dominant role of state
legislatures in the regulation of industry. The greater assertion of the
police power by state legislatures created an atmosphere in which anti-en-
trepreneurial suits became more attractive. A tangible result of the great
legislative output of the period was a large amount of statutory litigation
against public nuisances. Most of the legislation was aimed at moral vice,
such as drinking, gambling, and bawdy houses, and threats to physical
health, such as slaughter houses and hospitals for the contagiously ill.
Although few of the parties regulated by these enactments properly
could be called entrepreneurs, the increased litigation resulting from such
legislation probably earned greater legitimacy for injunctions directed
against entrepreneurs. Although the injunction action based on nuisance
became more prevalent during this period, the effectiveness of both the
statutory justification defense and the public nuisance defense diminished.
The defenses were weakened by changing judicial attitudes and the in-
creased availability of other means to avoid injunctions.
The late-19th and early-20th centuries were not, however, an era in
which most entrepreneurial defendants were enjoined in nuisance cases.
The denial of injunctive relief remained the norm throughout this period.
Moreover, the vague pro-entrepreneurial focus of earlier periods became
crystallized as nuisance law became increasingly defendant-oriented.
Rather than sidestepping the substantive definition of a nuisance, courts
changed the law, often imposing a negligence standard for liability. In
addition, a new substantive defense, the industrialization defense, was
developed.
Procedurally, a formal balancing test replaced the earlier ambiguous
standard for determining the propriety of an injunction. This balancing
test weighed the probable effect on the defendant of the grant of the
injunction against the probable effect on the plaintiff of denial. Those
few courts that openly rejected any balancing test invariably applied a
157. "The cases in which nuisances were enjoined were not frequent before the
middle of the last century, but since that time they have become very numerous,
covering a wide variety of states of fact." J. PoMERoY, A TREATISE ON EQUITABLE
REmzwas 869 (3d ed. 1905).
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loose definition of nuisance. Consequently, the entrepreneur usually
defended himself successfully.
Diminishment of the Statutory Justification and Public Nuisance
Defenses from 1871 to 1916
Statutory Justification
Legal orthodoxy continued to proclaim legislative hegemony for
authorizing activity, by statute or charter, which at common law would
be actionable as a nuisance. 158 Thus, in a suit brought in New York in
1872, the conviction on a public nuisance indictment of a defendant that
asserted its actions to be authorized by state charter was overturned."5 9
The court assumed that the legislature took into consideration the welfare
of the people, and declared that "the power of the legislature is omnipo-
tent, within constitutional limits.., if unauthorized by statute, these acts
would be a nuisance." 160 Similarly, in a case decided in Iowa in 1895, a
homeowner sought to enjoin the operation of a municipal stockyard that
was injurious to the health of the community. 6' The court, however,
refused to grant any injunctive relief because the city was operating the
market pursuant to a valid authorization by the state. So long as the
market was being operated within the terms of the state statute the court
was powerless to interfere. Some states went further and legislated statu-
tory justification protection for their entrepreneurs. 2
There were, however, indications that legislative authorizations were
no longer to be interpreted as broadly as before and that statutory justi-
fication was not an ironclad defense. In Bohan v. Port Jeris Gas Light
Co., 16 a homeowner sought to enjoin the defendant from producing
smoke and soot emissions that caused considerable damage to the home-
owner's property. The defendant, relying on its state charter and authori-
zation by the city, confidently asserted that the statute protected it
158. Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878); City of Pasadena v. Stimson,
91 Cal. 238, 27 P. 604 (1891); Bacon v. Walker, 77 Ga. 336 (1886); Vason v. South
Carolina R.R., 42 Ga. 631 (1871); Chicago N. Shore St. Ry. v. Payne, 192 Ill. 239,
61 N.E. 467 (1901); Miller v. Wrebster City, 94 Iowa 162, 62 N.W. 648 (1895); People v.
New York Gaslight Co., 64 Barb. 55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872).
159. People v. New York Gaslight Co., 64 Barb. 55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872).
160. Id. at 70.
161. Miller v. Webster City, 94 Iowa 162, 62 N.W. 648 (1895).
162. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3482, discussed in City of Pasadena v. Stimson, 91
Cal. 238, 27 P. 604 (1891).
163. 122 N.Y. 18, 25 N.E. 246 (1890).
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against all actions that did not claim and prove negligence. The court
specifically rejected this defense and granted the injunction, despite an
assumption that the defendant was not negligent. The court held that
statutory justification gave the defendant neither the right of eminent
domain nor any prescriptive rights.
In Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co.,1 a California
homeowner sought to enjoin a mining company from causing debris to
fall onto his land. As mining interests were important to the economy of
California, the invocation of statutory justification would have been
expected to provide immunity. A federal circuit court, however, granted
the injunction despite the assertion of that defense. The court gave little
weight to statutory justification and did not even make a finding on the
negligence issue, traditionally a prerequisite to entrepreneurial liability
under the statutory justification defense.
In Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church,' a
damage action for nuisance brought by a church against a railroad, the
Supreme Court of the United States refused to accept the statutory justi-
fication defense. The church alleged that the noise, cinders, and dust
created by the operation of the railroad constituted a nuisance that inter-
fered with its conduct of services and halved the value of its property.
Despite the charter granted by the state and the necessary creation of
noise by the operation of the railroad, the Court upheld an award of
damages to the church.
The Public Nuisance Defense
Just as the efficacy of the statutory justification defense was vitiated
during this period, so the public nuisance defense also became less power-
ful, though courts still warned plaintiffs that they could not seek reme-
dies for public nuisances without showing they had suffered special
damages. 6 Therefore, in Gates v. Kansas City Bridge & Terminal Rail-
'Way Co., 67 a plaintiff sought to enjoin the construction of a stone pier
by a defendant railroad company. The Supreme Court of Missouri
accepted the defendant's characterization of its behavior as a public
164. 18 F. 753 (C.C. Cal. 1884).
165. 108 U.S. 317 (1883).
166. See, e.g., Vail v. Mix, 74 Ill. 127 (1874); Pfingst v. Senn, 15 Ky. L. Rptr. 325
(1893); Dudley v. Kennedy, 63 Maine 465 (1874); Gates v. Kansas City Bridge &
Terminal Ry., 111 Mo. 28, 19 S.W. 957 (1892); Esson v. Wahier, 25 Ore. 7, 34 P. 756
(1893).
167. 111 Mo. 28, 19 S.W. 957 (1892).
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nuisance and refused injunctive relief to the plaintiff for failure to show
any kind of special damage different in quality from that suffered by
the public. Similarly, in Varl v. Mix,'08 a plaintiff was denied injunctive
relief against the reconstruction of a mill. While the Supreme Court of
Illinois conceded the allegation that the reconstruction of the mill would
create conditions hazardous to the neighborhood, relief was denied on
the strength of the public nuisance defense. The plaintiff was directed
to seek assistance from the state attorney general's office; the mere flood-
ing of his land was not sufficient damage to confer standing to seek
injunctive relief for a public nuisance.
A discernable change in the definition of public nuisance and in the
special damage required to confer individual standing, however, appeared
in the decisions of this era, diluting the public nuisance defense. More
courts came to rely on the distinction that had been offered in Wesson v.
Washburn Iron Co."9 between two classes of public nuisance, only one
of which required some kind of unique injury to confer individual stand-
ing. For example, in Roessler & Hasslacher Chemical Co. v. Doyle,70
the plaintiff sought damages and an injunction against a chemical manu-
facturer for fumes and other disturbances caused by the production of
sodium cyanide. The defendant, asserting that any damage it might be
inflicting also was suffered by many of the plaintiff's neighbors, sought
to invoke the public nuisance defense. The court summarily rejected this
contention and adopted the Wesson rationale that a defendant could not
plead the public nuisance defense merely because many people were
injured by the same nuisance.
A similar weakening of the public nuisance defense was reflected in a
damage action brought against a tannery that rendered a private home
uninhabitable because of the boiling of putrid animal matter.'1 ' Rejecting
the assertions that this was a public nuisance, the court wrote: "The idea
that if by a wrongful act a serious injury is inflicted upon a single individ-
ual a recovery may be had therefore against the wrongdoer and that if by
the same act'numbers are so injured no recovery may be had by anyone,
is absurd." 172 Courts were no longer permitting defendants to aggre-
gate individual private nuisances to create an immunizing public nuisance.
A broader definition of special damage enabled plaintiffs of this period
168. 74 Ii1. 127 (1874).
169. See notes 82-83 supra & accompanying text.
170. 73 NJ.L. 521, 64 A. 156 (1906).
171. Francis v. Schoellkopf, 52 N.Y. 152 (1873).
172. Id. at 154.
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to obtain injunctive relief. In Reyburn v. Sawyer,'73 the Supreme Court
of North Carolina granted an injunction against a commercial fisherman
who had used fish nets to block a publicly navigable waterway near the
plaintiff's land. It was not alleged that the plaintiff had any specific
interest in the waterway, but relief was granted because the defendant
obstructed the free use of property. On identical facts, courts in an
earlier period routinely would have denied individual relief. 174
Finally, in City of Texarkana v. Leach,'75 a private homeowner sought
to enjoin a city from closing a street running in front of his house. The
Supreme Court of Arkansas found it unnecessary to determine whether
there was any special damage and enjoined the city "notwithstanding it
would affect many others in the same manner." 176 Clearly, plaintiffs
more easily satisfied the special damage requirement during this period. 7
Procedural Law of Injunctions from 1871 to 1916
The Balancing Test
In the late-19th and early-20th centuries, courts finally articulated a
clear standard for determining if an injunction would be granted in
nuisance litigation. The vast majority of courts applied a balancing test
to determine the propriety of injunctive relief,17 8 which weighed the
173. 135 N.C. 328, 47 S.E. 761 (1904).
174. For a fact situation similar to Reybi-rn in which the Supreme Court of Errors
of Connecticut, 59 years earlier, refused injunctive relief, see O'Brien v. Norwich &
Worcester R.R., 17 Conn. 372 (1845).
175. 66 Ark. 40, 48 S.W. 807 (1898).
176. Id. at 42, 48 S.'V. at 807.
177. See, e.g., Goggans v. Myrick, 131 Ala. 286, 31 So. 22 (1901).
178. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Con. Co., 164 F. 927
(9th Cir. 1908); Bliss v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 167 F. 342 (C.C.D. Mont.
1909); McElroy v. Kansas City, 21 F. 257 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1884); Clifton Iron Co. v.
Dye, 87 Ala. 468, 6 So. 192 (1888); Rouse v. Martin, 75 Ala. 510 (1883); Fisk v. City
of Hartford, 70 Conn. 720, 40 A. 906 (1898); Daniels v. Keokuk Water Works, 61
Iowa 549 (1883); Boston Rolling Mills v. Cambridge, 117 Mass. 396 (1875); Potter v.
Saginaw Union Street Ry., 83 Mich. 285, 47 N.V. 217 (1890); Edwards v. Allouez
Mining Co., 38 Mich. 46 (1878); Fox v. Holcomb, 32 Mich. 494 (1875); Demarest v.
Hardham, 34 N.J. Eq. 469 (1881); Dorsey v. Allen, 85 N.C. 358 (1881); Daughtry v.
Warren, 85 N.C. 136 (1881); Brown v. Carolina Cent. Ry., 83 N.C. 128 (1880); McCann
v. Chasm Power Co., 211 N.Y. 301, 105 N.E. 416 (1914); Gray v. Manhattan Ry., 128
N.Y. 499, 28 N.E. 498 (1891); Bourne v. Wilson-Case Lumber Co., 58 Ore. 48, 113
P. 52 (1911); Becker v. Lebanon & M.S. Ry., 188 Pa. 484, 41 A. 612 (1898); Richard's
Appeal, 57 Pa. 105 (1868); Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113
Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904); Galveston, Houston & San Antonio Ry. v. Degroff,




probable effects on the plantiff, the defendant, and the public of granting
or denying relief. The applicability of this test was not limited expressly
to suits against businessmen, but by its nature it was revelant only to de-
fendants who had made some major investment. Therefore, the balancing
approach served as a device to protect the entrepreneur.
The first American court explicitly to adopt a balancing test to protect
the interests of an entrepreneur was the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in Richard's Appeal.179 In this 1868 suit, the plaintiff was a homeowner
seeking to enjoin the operation of an iron works that produced great
amounts of dust, soot, and noise. The defendant's use of bituminous coal
was conceded by the court to "materially operate to injure the dwelling-
house as a dwelling ... ." '10 The issue of nuisance itself was apparently
decided in favor of the plaintiff. The court, however, hastened to point
out that it was a serious mistake to assume that "whenever a case is made
out of wrongful acts on the one side and consequent injury on the other,
a decree to restrain the act complained of, must as certainly follow, as a
judgment would follow a verdict in a common-law court." 'll This state-
ment was neither remarkable nor unique, as many courts previously had
enunciated a distinction between the availability of equitable and legal
remedies. The Pennsylvania court, however, announced.the major con-
sideration that it would use in applying the general standard: "[Tlhe
chancellor will consider whether he would not do a greater injury by
enjoining than would result from refusing ....," 18' Significantly, the
court cited no case to support this approach and made no reference to
any generally accepted rule of decision.
Analyzing this new standard, the court recited the great investment in
capital machinery and payroll made by the defendant; the defendant's
$500,000 investment and employment of more than 800 men were
deemed sufficient to outweigh whatever small damage the claimant had
incurred. The Richard's court merely weighed the injuries suffered by
the respective parties. No overt reference was made to the public in-
terest in receiving the products of defendant's iron works or in a thriving
economy. The court, however, was sensitive to the important role played
by iron in the state's economy, asserting the defendant's enterprise to be
"amongst the most [extensive] .. . of any of [its] kind in the Common-
wealth." 183 A more complete formulation of the balancing test appeared
179. 57 Pa. 105 (1868).
180. Id. at 111.
181. Id. at 113.
182. Id. at li3-14.
183. Id. at 111.
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in Demarest v. Hardham1'4 As stated by Vice Chancellor Van Fleet of
New Jersey, "the court is bound to compare consequences. If the fact of
an actionable nuisance is clearly established, then the court is bound to
consider whether a greater injury will not be done by granting an injunc-
tion, and thus destroying a citizen's property and taking away from him
his means of livelihood, than will result from a refusal, and leaving the
injured party to his ordinary legal remedy . . ," 185 Fully expressed, the
balancing test weighed not only the interests of plaintiff and defendant,
but also those of the community and the general public.
Richard's Appeal, cited by courts long after it was ostensibly over-
ruled in its own jurisdiction,'86 quickly became recognized as a leading
case. Although it appeared in the mid-19th century, the decision repre-
sented the thinking of courts into the 20th century. The rule was of
obvious value to the entrepreneur who was starting with almost a pre-
sumption in his favor. The entrepreneur's expenditures were surely to
be significant, particularly in comparison with those of a private home-
owner. Even if he were unfortunate enough to be subject to the juris-
diction of a court applying the traditional plaintiff-oriented law of
nuisance, 187 an entrepreneur still could rely on the balancing test to
protect himself from an injunction. Although a few cases applying the
balancing rule granted anti-entrepreneurial injunctions, ' s the overwhelm-
ing majority denied injunctive relief. The entrepreneurial defendant also
benefited when the procedural balancing test was transmuted by some
courts8 9 to a test to determine the existence of a nuisance, not simply to
assay the applicability of injunctive relief.
184. 34 N.J. Eq. 469 (1881).
185. Id. at 473.
186. In Evans v. Reading Chem. Fert. Co., 160 Pa. 209, 28 A. 702 (1894), the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, per curiamn, a lower court decision granting
an injunction in a nuisance case. The lower court had written, in discussing Richard's
Appeal, "none [of the casesi nor all of them, can be authority for the proposition
that equity, a case for its cognizance being otherwise made out, will refuse to protect
a man in the possession and enjoyment of his property because that right is less
valuable to him than the power to destroy it may be to his neighbor or to the public."
Id. at 223, 28 A. at 709. In Becker v. Lebanon & M. Ry., 188 Pa. 484, 41 A. 612 (1818),
the court returned to the balancing test delineated in Richard's Appeal.
187. Some courts in this era retained the traditional substantive nuisance law. See
note 216 infra.
188. See, e.g., McElroy v. Kansas Citv, 21 F. 257 (C.C.AV.D. Mo. 1884); Demarest v.
Hardham, 34 N.J. Eq. 469 (1901).
189. See, e.g., Westcott v. Middleton, 43 N.J. Eq. 478, 11 A. 490 (1887); Eller v.
Koehler, 68 Ohio St. 51, 67 N.E. 89 (1903); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113
Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886); Powell v. Bentley & Gerwig Furn. Co., 34 XV. Va. 804, 12
S.E. 1085 (1891). See note 245 infra & accompanying text.
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Although all entrepreneurs might have benefitted from the application
of the balancing test, it was especially beneficial to those engaged in the
extraction of natural resources. For example, in Bliss v. Anaconda Copper
Mining Co.,190 a Montana farmer complained of interference with the
use of his property. Although the court found that the plaintiff's $4,000
investment was rendered virtually valueless by the defendant's smelting
operations, it nevertheless denied relief on the basis of three critical facts.
First, it found that the defendant had several million dollars invested in
its plant and was operating at peak efficiency. Second, the court took
notice that Montana was primarily a mining area. Finally, it stressed the
manifest congressional policy in favor of the economic development of
the area by mining interests. The court predicted a general area-wide
depression if it were to enjoin the defendant.
The invocation of the public interest on behalf of the defendant made
injunction suits easier to defend. In Madison v. Ducktowvn Sulphur, Cop-
per & Iron Co.,' 91 a group of farmers sought to enjoin the operation of
the defendant's ore reduction plant, which created great quantities of dirt
and smoke. The court conceded that the property of the plaintiffs had
been "badly injured." The crops formerly cultivated no longer could
be grown and the farmland timber was largely destroyed. After examin-
ing the entrepreneur's capital investment, the court laid stress on the
great damage to the community that would be inflicted by the grant of
a prohibitory injunction; over half of the community's tax base would
vanish and virtually all of the 12,000 residents would lose their jobs if
such relief were granted. Thus, the public interest provided support for
the denial of relief against the defendant's operation. In fact, the court,
in a reversal of the normal course of argument on the issue of eminent
domain, accused the plaintiffs of attempting to take the defendant's prop-
erty without just compensation. 92
The courts did not require that the economy of the community be
totally dependent on the entrepreneur for him to invoke the public inter-
est as a factor to be weighed in his favor. In Dorsey v. Allen,'9' a home-
owner sought to enjoin the construction of a single cotton gin. Although
no indication was given that this was the only cotton gin available in the
town, the court denied injunctive relief against the nuisance, writing:
190. 167 F. 342 (C.C.D. Mont. 1909).
191. 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904).
192. The same plant later was enjoined by the Supreme Court of the United States
in a proceeding brought by the state of Georgia. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230 (1906).
193. 85 N.C. 358 (1881).
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"[I]t would be an unwise exercise of power... for the court to interpose
and prevent its being carried out, with its promises of substantial and
lasting benefits to a community, because of the discomfort and incon-
venience a single family or a small number of persons may experience
from its presence in their vicinity, so inconsiderable when weighed in
the scale with the public interests." 1.4 The Supreme Court of Iowa
wrote in 1883 that "the inconvenience and annoyance must yield to the
public good in so far as the interposition of equity is concerned." "'
Commentators reacted variously to the widespread adoption of the
balancing test to determine the availability of injunctive relief. Professor
Henry McClintock, writing in 1928, strongly endorsed the balancing
concept, including consideration of the public interest as an important
factor in the calculation. "It would seem to be clear that the court can
and ought to refuse an injunction where to issue it would cause an injury
to the public interests out of all proportion to the injury which is caused
to the plaintiff by the tort he seeks to enjoin." 196 McClintock, who in-
sisted that the proper term for the process was "balancing the hardships"
rather than "balancing the equities," 197 described the procedure as "wise
social engineerin ." A student commentator warned that a contrary rule,
which would require an injunction on a mere showing of the existence of
a nuisance, "would lead to great hardship, extortionate claims, and eco-
nomic waste." 198 An author, in the Americaz Law Register, confidently
wrote early in the 20th century that "[i]t is surely evident that the general
belief and impression in the profession is that courts of equity will weigh
the effect of their decrees before making them and that the balance of
injury is a most important factor in determining the advisability of...
action on their part." '99 An even more favorable attitude toward the
entrepreneur was expressed by Professor Spelling: "[Tlhe importance of
manufacturing and industrial pursuits generally and the general favor
194. Id. at 361.
195. Daniels v. Keokuk Water Works, 61 Iowa 549, 555, 16 N.W. 705, 707 (1883).
196. McClintock, Discretion to Deny Injunction Against Trespass and Nuisance, 12
MINN. L. Rav. 565, 573 (1928).
197. Balancing the equities, according to McClintock, was a much broader test,
including an examination of motives and the existence of "clean hands." See McClintock,
supra note 196.
198. 37 YALE L.J. 96, 101 (1927).
199. Note, Balancing Injuries in Determining the Right to an Injunction, 54 Am. L.
REa. 245, 250 (1906). The author also stated that "[tihe doctrine that every man is
necessarily entitled to an injunction . . . when his rights are encroached upon, finds but
few precedents in the decisions." Id. at 246. See also Slaymaker, The Rule of Com-
parative Injury in the Law of Injunction, 60 CErr. L.J. 23 (1905).
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with which they are viewed would be sufficient reason for withholding
relief by total suppression by injunction except in extreme cases ..... 2
Not all the writers favored the new development. Fairly early in the
period, in the first American treatise devoted solely to nuisance law,
Horace Gay Wood wrote that "where the right is clear, and the nuis-
ance is established, oz injunction 'will always be granted .... When the
right and its violation by a continuous.., act is established, an injunction
may fairly be said to be a matter of right." 201 Because Wood wrote early
in the period, when the balancing principle was still in its formative
stage, he was not forced to address or distinguish the many balancing
decisions of the period. Writing in 1905, at the height of the balancing
era, however, Professor Pomeroy recognized that the question "has
received considerable attention from the courts," 202 but severely criticized
the rule. As for balancing the interests of the two parties, Pomeroy stated
that "it is anomalous to deny the equitable relief in a case where the legal
wrong and the inadequacy of the legal remedy are established." 203 Pom-
eroy also criticized the courts that used a balancing test that took the
public interest into account. "The refusal of the injunction . . . leaves
the plaintiff to suffer an admitted legal wrong and to obtain his only
redress by an admittedly inadequate remedy." 204 Dismissing as dicta
most of the judicial language endorsing the balancing test, he added
that if the public interest demanded such use of the defendant's property,
then legislative use of the eminent domain power was appropriate. 205
Judicial Opposition to the Balancing Approach
Some courts did not adopt a balancing test on the injunction issue.
An outstanding example of this approach is Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v.
200. T. SPELLING, INJUNCIONS AND OTHER ExrRAoRDINARY REMEDIES § 380 (2d. ed.
1901). Spelling added: "In cases of private nuisances a court of equity will balance
the inconvenience likely to be incurred by the respective parties in exercising its dis-
cretion to grant or withhold relief; and where greater harm would result from enjoining
than from refusing to enjoin, the injunction will be refused." Id. at § 417. Cooley,
though not advocating a balancing test, pointed out that there were many cases in
which damages were proper and a prohibitory injunction was nor. T. COOLEY, EL.amFNTs
OF TORTS (1st ed. 1895).
201. H. WOOD, A PRACTICAL TREATIsE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES § 774 (1st ed. 1875).
1202. J. POMEROY, supra note 157, at 903.
203. Id. at 906.
204. Id. at 910.
205. Id. at 907 n.155, 907-10. A student writer in 1901 suggested that "it seems best
for the courts to allow an injunction whenever a legal right appears and leave any
changes necessary to legislation." 14 HARv. L. REv. 458, 459 (1901).
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Malone.20 6 The plaintiff in Malone, a homeowner and hotel keeper,
sought damages and an injunction against the defendant whose fertilizer
factory emitted noxious fumes and produced great amounts of noise.
Pointing to the great amount of money invested in the factory and the
public interest in its continued operation, the defendant urged the court
to adopt a balancing test. The court specifically rejected the defendant's
argument, stating that "no one has the right to erect.. . a nuisance ...
and then say he has expended large sums of money in the erection...
while the neighboring property is comparatively of little value." 207
The courts rejecting balancing generally explained that the denial of
injunctive relief to injured plaintiffs amounted to a taking of property
by the defendant. In Evans v. Reading Chemical Fertilizing Co.,2" 8 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the decision of a lower court
confronted with the many balancing cases: "None [of the cases], nor
all of them, can be authority for the proposition that equity, a case for
its cognizance being otherwise made out, will refuse to protect a man in
the possession and enjoyment of his property because that right is less
valuable to him than the power to destroy it may be to his neighbor or to
the public." 20o The antibalancing rule was applied by some courts in
riparian rights cases.210 The most significant case in this group was
Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co.,211 in which the Court of Appeals of
New York held that "[a]lthough the damage to the plaintiff may be
slight as compared with the defendant's expense of abating the condition,
that is not a good reason for refusing an injunction." 212 This holding,
though on its facts confined to riparian rights cases, later was alleged to
have established an antibalancing rule in nuisance injunction cases."'
Entrepreneurs faced with a judicial refusal to balance interests on the
injunction issue would have been in serious trouble if these courts had
206. 73 Md. 268, 20 A. 900 (1890). See also McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining
Co., 140 F. 951 (C.C.D. Utah 1904); Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161
Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911); People v. Detroit White Lead Works, 82 Mich. 471, 46
N.W. 735 (1890); Hennessy v. Carmony, 50 N.J. Eq. 616, 25 A. 374 (1892); McClung v.
North Bend Coal & Coke Co., 9 Ohio C.C.R. 259 (Cir. Ct. 1895).
207. 73 Md. at 282, 20 A. at 902.
208. 160 Pa. 209, 28 A. 702 (1894).
209. Id. at 223, 28 A. at 709.
210. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Amador & Sacramento Canal Co., 66 Cal. 161, 4 P. 1147
(1884); Chestatee Pyrites Co. v. Cavenders Creek Gold Mining Co., 118 Ga. 255, 45 S.E.
267 (1903); Higgins v. Flemington Water Co., 36 N.J. Eq. 538 (1883).
211. 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913).
212. Id. at 5, 101 N.E. at 806.




applied the traditional plaintiff-oriented substantive law of nuisance.
Courts that rejected the balancing test, however, invariably applied a de-
fendant-oriented substantive law of nuisance.214 Thus, although these
courts were more likely to grant anti-entrepreneurial injunctive relief,
they often would not reach the issue of damages, finding no nuisance to
be present.
Substantive Law of Nuisance from 1871 to 1916
Although the entrepreneur was protected from injunctions by the pro-
cedural law of the late-19th and early-20th centuries, he also was aided
considerably by a change in the substantive law of nuisance. Although
in earlier periods the law clearly was plaintiff-oriented, courts during this
period significantly altered the standards used to define a nuisance. Proba-
bly the most drastic departure from Blackstone's orthodoxy was a ten-
dency of courts to define nuisance relative to the effects on the total
community and to the interests of the parties and the neighborhood.
Although few courts actually adopted a balancing test to define a
nuisance,215 the focus in nuisance law was no longer solely on the plain-
tiff's injury. The behavior of the defendant, as well as public interests,
were used to determine the existence of a nuisance. The entrepreneur
benefitted here directly; not only could antidevelopmental injunctions
be avoided, but so could damage judgments. In addition to the relativistic
definition of nuisance, the imposition of a negligence standard by some
courts, the requirement of material injury, and the introduction of the
industrialization defense were advantageous to defendants.
General Loosening of the Definition of Nuisance
Most courts during this period moved away from Blackstone's defini-
tion of nuisance. In the earlier periods, courts had considered only the
rights of the individual parties in nuisance actions. By the turn of the
214. See notes 216-51 infra & accompanying text.
215. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, for example, in a suit to enjoin
the ringing of a factory bell, wrote: "with the increase of population in a neighbor-
hood, and the advancement and development of business, the quiet and seclusion and
customary enjoyment of homes are necessarily interefered with, until it becomes
a question how the right which each person has of prosecuting his lawful business in
a reasonable and proper manner shall be made consistent with the other right which
each person has to be free from unreasonable disturbance in the enjoyment of his
property." Sawyer v. Davis, 136 Mass. 239, 240-41 (1884). See also Robinson v. Baugh,
31 Mich. 289 (1875); McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co, 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549
(1907).
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century, however, the focus had widened and courts had begun to take
into account a broader range of factors. Considerable attention was paid
to all the circumstances, and the relative nature of nuisances was stressed
repeatedly. For example, in McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,216
the Court of Appeals of New York, which had rejected the balancing
test on the injunction issue,2 17 described the law of private nuisance as
"a law of degree [which] usually turns on the question of fact whether
the use is reasonable under the circumstances." 218 Thus, though there
would not be any special consideration to the entrepreneur if the
propriety of an injunction were at issue, a question concerning the
existence of a nuisance would be resolved by viewing all the surrounding
circumstances.
Other evidence of the general loosening of the substantive law of
nuisance was the willingness of the courts to criticize plaintiffs who
insisted on extreme or technical rights when seeking anti-entrepreneurial
injunctions. The traditional definition was rejected flatly by some courts
and ignored by most. In Eller v. Koehler,219 the Supreme Court of Ohio,
in a suit for damages, reversed a lower court for giving the Blackstone
definition in its charge to the jury. Condemning this as "a too literal
interpretation of a very old definition of nuisance,'" 221 the court declared
that the issue of nuisance was to be determined by an examination of all
of the surrounding circumstances.
Some courts moved close to an explicit balancing test on the merits in
an attempt to resolve the dilemma posed by a New Jersey chancellor in
1887: "Is an occupation which is absolutely essential to the welfare of
society to be condemned by the courts, to be classified with nuisances,
and to be expelled from localities where all innocent and innoxious trades
may be carried on?" _221 In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. SaG1derson ,2 22 a
plaintiff sought damages from a mining company that had totally de-
stroyed the water supply on the plaintiff's farm. The court concluded
that the plaintiff's "mere private personal inconvenience ... must yield
216. 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907). Some courts, however. rerained the strict Black-
stonian formulation of nuisance law. See, e.g., Ellis v. Kansas Cit-, St. Joseph & C. B.
R.R., 63 Mo. 131 (1876); Holman v. Mineral Print Zinc Co., 135 Wis. 132, 115 N.W.
327 (1908).
217. See notes 211-12 supra & accompanying text.
218. 189 N.Y. at 40, 81 N.E. at 549 (emphasis supplied).
219. 68 Ohio St. 51, 67 N.E. 89 (1903).
220. Id. at 55, 67 N.E. at 90.
221. Westcott v. Middleton, 43 N.J. Eq. 478, 483, 11 A. 490, 492-93 (1887).
222. 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886).
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to the necessities of a great public industry, which although in the hands
.of a private corporation, subserves a great public interest." 223 Because
Pennsylvania Coal was a suit for damages, this balancing was done on
the merits of the existence of a nuisance and was not influenced by fears
that the defendant's business would actually be shut down if the plaintiff
were successful. Powell v. Bentley & Gerwig Furniture Co.224 came
close to elaborating an explicit balancing test on the merits. Powell was
a suit to enjoin the operation of a furniture factory as a nuisance. The
court asserted that "public policy and general convenience require
that.., something more shall be conceded to useful and beneficial work
than to useless and idle amusements ... extreme rights are not enforce-
able rights." 225 These courts were applying the same considerations on
the substantive issue of nuisance as the majority of courts were applying
on the procedural issue of the availability of injunctive relief.
The secondary sources also evidence the development of a less rigid
test of nuisance. Pomeroy, one of the strongest opponents of use of the
balancing test to determine the propriety of an injunction,226 justified
his opposition by assuming that the balancing test would be applied on
the underlying substantive issue. If a nuisance were alleged to be caused
by noise, vibration, or pollution of the air, "a balancing of injury...
[would be], of course, an essential factor in the decision whether any
nuisance exist[ed] or not." 227 In his treatise on the law of nuisance Joyce
prefaced-a chapter on trades and-businesses with the assertion: "what
constitutes a nuisance with reference to the carrying on of a trade or
business is a question of fact which is not easy to determine." 2 8
Several specific manifestations of the relaxation of the harsh standards
of Blackstonian nuisance law appeared in the decisions of this period.
Virtually all courts required a material injury to be demonstrated by
the plaintiff. In addition, some courts moved toward a negligence stan-
dard for the imposition of liability. Finally, many courts adopted a new
substantive defense of "industrialization."
223. Id. at 149, 6 A. at 459.
224. 34 W. Va. 804, 12 SE. 1085 (1891).
225. Id. at 809-10, 12 S.E. at 1087.
226. See notes 202-05 supra & accompanying text.
227. 5 J. PoMEoy, supra note 157, at 903.
228. J. JoYcE & H. JoYcE, LAw oF NuisANCEs § 85 (1906). It is instructive to compare
the authors' relativistic attitude toward business with their general treatment of balancing
on the merits of nuisance: "[T]he law will not undertake to balance conveniences or
estimate the difference between the injury sustained by the plaintiff, and the loss that
may result to defendant from having its trade or business found to be a nuisance. . .
Id. at § 483.
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Material Injury
In contrast to the earlier conception of interference actionable as a
nuisance, courts of the late-19th and early-20th centuries required that
the plaintiff demonstrate either material or substantial impairment of his
rights in property. In Campell v. Seaman,229 for example, the plaintiffs
were a group of homeowners seeking to enjoin the defendant's brick-
making, which was demonstrated to be a health hazard. The Court of
Appeals of New York, though finding a nuisance to exist and enjoining
further operation of the brickyard, warned that the standard it was ap-
plying was different from the earlier sic utere formulation. Claiming that
the maxim "could not be enforced in civilized society," 230 the court out-
lined a new test of nuisance: "To constitute a nuisance, the use must be
such as to produce . . . injury to neighboring property ... such as to
render its enjoyment specially uncomfortable or inconvenient." 231
In O'wen v. Phillips,232 a group of homeowners sought to enjoin the
operation of a flour mill. The trial judge had added the words "materially
and essentially" to the plaintiff's requested charge, which recited Black-
stone's definition verbatim. The Supreme Court of Indiana upheld this
refusal to give the traditional charge and the requirement of material
damage to the plaintiff. "If it were otherwise," the court explained, "all
mills and manufactories might be stopped at the demand of those to
whom they caused annoyance, even though the injury complained of
might be slight and trivial." 233 Although there traditionally had been a
minimum amount of injury required to satisfy the de minimis non curat
lex standard, earlier courts never had required substantial or material
injury as a predicate to nuisance liability. By 1875, however, at least one
court, though purporting to apply Blackstone's definition, had subtly
transformed it to state that "everything that disturbs in an unrea-
sonable degree the quiet enjoyment of a home or dwelling-house is a
nuisance." 234
Commentators concurred in this revised definition. Joyce defined
nuisance as that which "causes a substantial injury to another either as
to his personal or property rights." 235 Wood, in defining how courts
229. 63 N.Y. 568 (1876), aff'g 2 Thomp. & Cook 231 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1873).
230. Id. at 577.
231. Id. (emphasis supplied).
232. 73 Ind. 284 (1881).
233. Id. at 288.
234. Wallace v. Aver, 10 Phila. 356 (Pa. C.P. 1875).
235. J. JoYcE & H. JOYCE, supra note 228, at § 85.
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should behave in the declaration of nuisances, said that courts should
"never declare a business a nuisance, except there be such essential injury
and damage that the act or thing cannot be justly tolerated without doing
great violence to the rights of individuals." 236
By requiring a greater showing of injury on the part of the plaintiff,
courts were aiding directly the cause of the defendant entrepreneur. As
the courts were handling more and more anti-entrepreneurial nuisance
litigation, the substantive law was becoming more defendant-oriented.
No longer favorable to plaintiffs, nuisance law was transformed, first
proving increasingly advantageous to defendant entrepreneurs; this
transformation eventually infused all nuisance law.
217
Negligence
Courts also examined the conduct of the defendant to qualify the
previously accepted standard of absolute liability for nuisances. During
the earlier period liability was absolute, inasmuch as anything done by
a defendant that caused actionable nuisance to the plaintiff's property was
remediable. Therefore, the courts made no inquiry into the reasonable-
ness of the defendant's use of his property. A negligence standard 'of
liability generally was not recognized in nuisance law, being applicable
only to a defense of statutory justification: the defendant was liable for
injuries occurring in the course of operations within the statutory autho-
rization only if these activities had been conducted negligently.
The reasonable use defense previously pleaded by defendants in
statutory justification became a device frequently used by entrepreneurs.
Although many courts still rejected any overt adoption of a negligence
standard, 38 other courts accepted a negligence standard in the analysis of
the defendant's conduct. In Windfall Manufacturing Co. v. Patterson,2
the plaintiff sought to enjoin the digging of a gas well within 50
yards of his home. The court, defining actionable conduct, stated that
the plaintiff could "insist that a business in any degree offensive or dan-
gerous . . . shall be carried on with such improved means. and appliances
as experience and science may suggest or supply .... ,, 240 Thus, the
236. H. WooD, supra note 201, at § 6. See also Tuttle v. Church, 53 F. 422 (C.C.D.R.I.
1892).
237. A nuisance is a wrong "producing material annoyance, inconvenience, discom-
fort, or hurt." 66 C.J.S. Nuisance § 1 (1950).
238. See, e.g., Pennover v. Allen, 56 XVis. 502, 511, 14 N.,V. 609, 613 (1883).
239. 148 Ind. 414, 47 N.E. 2 (1897).
240. Id. at 421, 47 N.E. at 4.
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standard was not whether the defendant was acting to cause injury to
the plaintiff but rather whether the defendant was acting as a reasonable
man. In Green v. Lake,241 the Supreme Court of Mississippi refused to
find a nuisance in the operation of a gristmill, holding that the defendant
had a right to operate it if done "without inflicting unnecessary and
reasonably avoidable injury on others or their property." 242
Even courts that relied on other grounds to deny injunctive relief
referred to the negligence standard as a supportive rationale. In Phillips
v. Laurence Vitrified Brick & Tile Co.,24' the Supreme Court of Kansas,
after applying a procedural balancing test to affirm a denial of an injunc-
tion, noted that "modern methods and appropriate appliance were used
by the defendant in the manufacture of the brick and there was no negli-
gence in the operation of the plant." 244 The absence of negligence,
according to traditional doctrine, was irrelevant to a determination of the
existence of a nuisance. Nonetheless, lack of negligence was cited by
many courts to support their refusal to find a nuisance. Joyce, though
ostensibly rejecting negligence as a standard to determine if a defendant's
behavior constituted a nuisance, wrote "[a business] may, however, be so
negligently conducted as practically to become a nuisance, in which case
negligence must be shown to entitle a plaintiff to recover damages." 245
The Industrialization Defense
One outgrowth of the use of surrounding circumstances to define
nuisance was the development of a new substantive defense for the
industrial entrepreneur. Relying on a decision by the House of Lords, 46
American courts announced the industrialization defense. The substance
of this defense was that a defendant, though creating what otherwise
would be considered a nuisance in regard to a particular plaintiff, would
be shielded from liability if he could show that the general geographical
241. 54 Miss. 540 (1877).
242. Id. at 547 (emphasis supplied).
243. 72 Kans. 643, 82 P. 787 (1905).
244. Id. t 643, 82 P. at 787.
245. J. JoycE & H. Jo,'cE, supra note 228, at § 92. See also Bliss v. Washoe Copper
Co., 186 F. 789 (9th Cir. 1911); Siefried v. Hays, 81 Ky. 377 (1883); Butterfield v.
Klaber, 52 How. Pr. 255 (N.Y. Super. Cr. 1877); Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Co., 222 Pa. 72, 70 A. 775 (1908); Gose v. Coryell, 59 Tex. Civ. App. 504, 126 S.W.
1164 (1910); Gulf, Colo. & S. F. Ry. v. Oakes, 94 Tex. 155, 58 S.W. 999 (1900); Dolan
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 118 Wis. 362, 95 N.W. 385 (1903).




area in which the defendant was situated had been given over to indus-
trial or nuisance-producing pursuits. The first American court to apply
this rule was the Supreme Court of Michigan in a decision written by
Justice Cooley, Gilbert v. Showerman.247 The plaintiff, a private home-
owner, sought to enjoin the defendant's steam-driven flour mill as a
nuisance. Conceding that there was annoyance to the plaintiff and his
family, the court nevertheless concluded that because the area already
was industrialized there was no enjoinable nuisance. The court wrote
that "all that can be required of the men who shall engage in [the most
offensive trades] is that due regard shall be had to fitness of locality." 248
Although Showerman did not render damages unavailable to the plain-
tiff, courts quickly broadened the defense. In Bowmnan v. Humphrey,249
the Supreme Court of Iowa declined to award the plaintiff damages
because one who lives in an industrial area "may be called upon to sub-
mit to some inconveniences arising therefrom .... , 250 Otherwise, the
court pointed out, factories and other industrial enterprises only could
be built far from human habitation. Similarly, in 1871 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania wrote that "the people who live in.. . a city...
do so of choice, and they voluntarily subject themselves to its peculiarities
and its discomforts, for the greater benefit they think they derive from
their residence . . . there." 251 The entrepreneur had added another
weapon to his ever burgeoning arsenal.
247. 23 Mich. 447 (1871).
248. Id. at 455. The court used a concept akin to Chief Justice Shaw's common-
wealth idea. 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN EcoNOMiY: MASSACHUSErs, 1774-1861 (1947). His
biographer stated that the commonwealth idea was "one of the major themes" of Shaw's
life work. L. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 305
(1957). As Levy described it, the commonwealth idea was "essentially a quasi-mercan-
tilist concept of the state within a democratic framework. In Europe where the state
was not responsible to the people and was the product of remote historical forces,
mercantilism served the ruling classes who controlled the state. In America men put
the social-contract theory into practice and actually made their government. The people
were the state; the state was their 'Common Wealth'. They identified themselves with
it and felt that they should share, as of right, in the advantages that it could bring to
them as a community. The state was their means of promoting the general interest."
Id. Cooley in Showerman relied heavily on Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.)
53 (1851), one of Shaw's outstanding decisions outlining the police power in the state.
249. 124 Iowa 744, 100 N.W. 854 (1904).
250. Id. at 745, 100 N.W. at 855.
251. Huckenstine's Appeal, 70 Pa. 102, 107 (1871). See also Hurlbut v. McKone, 55
Conn. 31, 10 A. 164 (1887); Meigs v. Lister, 23 N.J. Eq. 199 (1872); Hafer v. Guynan,
7 Pa. Dist. R. 21 (1897).
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SUMMARY
In the period from 1789 to 1836, few plaintiffs sought to enjoin entre-
preneurs, despite recognition in England during the 18th century of the
injunction as a possible remedy against private nuisance. Those few
courts that did consider such suits almost invariably rejected the claim
for injunctive relief, refusing to grant nuisance injunctions on procedural
grounds and declining to address themselves to the strict substantive law
of nuisance.
Between 1837 and 1870, a greater number of nuisance injunction suits
were brought as the remedy became a more legitimate part of American
law. Entrepreneurs defended themselves by asserting the impropriety of
injunctive relief, rather than the nonexistence of a nuisance. The sub-
stantive law of nuisance continued to favor plaintiffs despite the
unspoken special consideration given to the entrepreneurial defendant.
During this period, entrepreneurs asserted also the public nuisance
defense, the harmless building defense, and the statutory justification
defense to avoid prohibitory injunctions.
From 1871 to 1916, a greater number of injunction suits were brought
as the United States became an industrialized power. Although injunc-
tions were granted slightly more often, entrepreneurs gained a greater
doctrinal protection. The procedural analysis during this period was
characterized by an explicit balancing of the interests of the private
homeowner and the entrepreneur, often with the consideration of the
public interest, to the entrepreneur's benefit. Additionally, the substan-
tive law of nuisance, at least in cases involving entrepreneurs, increasingly
protected defendants. This change protected entrepreneurs not only
against the injunction but also against the damage suit.
Although it is not the intent of this Article to assign a causal relation-
ship between legal doctrine and social change, the striking congruity in
the 19th-century United States between industrial growth and the
development of a nuisance doctrine that increasingly favored the entre-
preneur cannot escape notice. As quickly as economic growth magnified
the potential for conflict between landowner and businessman, new legal
doctrine developed to enable the American entrepreneur to avoid the
debilitating effects of the prohibitory injunction. For better or worse, the
evolving substantive and procedural law of private nuisance presented
few obstacles to continued economic expansion.
